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ABSTRACT 
A separation kernel can be used as the foundation of a high assurance system that 
enforces mandatory security policies. The contexts in which such separation kernels 
might be used include support for a distributed trusted path, high assurance routing, and 
for a multilevel secure mobile device that supports an extraordinary access partition for 
access to sensitive data during a crisis. Separation kernel requirements call for an audit 
subsystem that helps to enforce accountability policy by allowing administrators to detect 
unauthorized activities from the logs collected. The Least Privilege Separation Kernel 
(LPSK) being implemented for the Trusted Computing Exemplar (TCX) project did not 
have an audit subsystem.  
This thesis describes the design and implementation of an audit subsystem for the 
LPSK. Requirements were gathered based on an existing specification and protection 
profile. A variable-length token-based audit log format was designed to allow flexibility 
in recording different types of events. Interfaces to other LPSK modules and non-LPSK 
modules were designed and a prototype was developed. Testing results show that the 
prototype supports the LPSK audit requirements. Hence, this work demonstrates the 
feasibility of implementing the LPSK audit subsystem based on the proposed design. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. MOTIVATION 
To reduce software, hardware and management costs, organizations might choose 
to use a single system to handle multiple types of information, which could include 
information of different sensitivity levels. In such as system, the assurance that the 
security policy is properly enforced to protect against unauthorized information flow is of 
utmost importance.  
In certain scenarios, timely availability of information could be critical in certain 
circumstances, such as during emergencies. For example, the first responders might need 
access to sensitive information not normally available to them. A high assurance 
multilevel secure device such as the E-device [1] proposed by the Naval Postgraduate 
School, supports this kind of operation by allowing the users to switch a platform to an 
emergency mode for the duration of the crisis, which gives them the necessary access. 
The Naval Postgraduate School Trusted Computing Exemplar (TCX) project [2] 
is developing a high assurance platform that that could provide solutions to the use cases 
described above. The TCX objectives include a high assurance reference implementation 
that includes a Least Privilege Separation Kernel (LPSK). The LPSK isolates the 
resources into different partitions and has granular control over the configuration of 
information flow between the partitions.  
The LPSK is built to comply with the U.S. Government Protection Profile for 
Separation Kernels in Environments Requiring High Robustness (SKPP) [3]. The SKPP 
is a requirements document that contains the security objectives, functional requirements 
and assurance requirements for a separation kernel. The SKPP mandates that any 
separation kernel, including the LPSK, that seeks certification against it must minimally 
fulfill the audit requirements stated in the protection profile. Separation kernels might 
also include additional audit requirements depending on their specific implementations.  
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-
53 [4] describes the recommended security controls for federal information systems and 
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organizations. It mandates the implementation of audit and accountability that can 
uniquely trace actions back to users. The proposed E-device, for example, must provide a 
mechanism to determine whether the first responders are gaining access to data beyond 
what is needed to accomplish their missions.  An effective audit subsystem could 
facilitate an after action review by rebuilding the entire chain of events that occurred 
during the crisis.  
B. PURPOSE OF STUDY 
The purpose of this thesis was to design and implement a prototype of an audit 
subsystem for the LPSK. The requirements were gathered from the LPSK functional 
specifications [5] and the SKPP. The objective of the design was to seek answers to the 
following questions: 
 What factors must be considered when designing an audit subsystem for a 
separation kernel? 
 What information should the audit records contain and in what format? 
 What interfaces are needed for the audit subsystem to interact with other 
components? 
 Can an audit subsystem constructed as part of the LPSK prototype meet the 
requirements of the LPSK functional specifications and SKPP? 
An audit subsystem prototype of was developed to demonstrate the feasibility of 
the design.  A test plan was devised and the prototype was tested to ensure it behaves 
according to specifications. 
C. ORGANIZATION OF PAPER 
The thesis is organized into six chapters. Each chapter is systematically organized 
to provide an in-depth discussion of the different aspects of the thesis. 
 Chapter I introduces this thesis. The motivation and purpose of study were 
discussed.  
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 Chapter II provides the background information on separation kernels, the 
Principal of Least Privilege, the Common Criteria and specifically the SKPP, 
the TCX project, the purpose of auditing, log management architectures and 
audit record standards.  
 Chapter III describes the requirements for the LPSK audit subsystem. It 
includes discussions of audit record event selection, automatic response, data 
generation and data review. It also provides a list of events to be audited. 
 Chapter IV describes the design and implementation of the LPSK audit 
subsystem. It starts with  a presentation of a high level design to introduce the 
various components involved in the audit subsystem. This is followed by 
detailed discussions of audit record formats and how the components interface 
with one another. This chapter ends with a description of the implementation 
of the audit subsystem prototype. 
 Chapter V describes how the LPSK audit subsystem prototype was tested 
according to developmental and acceptance testing plans. 
 Chapter VI provides a summary of the work that has been done for this thesis 
and a discussion of the challenges faced. Related work is also discussed to 
compare the different approaches used in similar projects. This is followed by 
a conclusion of the thesis and suggestions for future work. 
This chapter introduced the thesis by describing the motivation and purpose of 
study, and gave an overview of the organization of the paper. Focus now changes to 
background material needed to appreciate the work that follows. 
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II. BACKGROUND  
This chapter provides background information regarding separation kernels and 
the necessary audit mechanisms to support them. The concept of a Least Privilege 
Separation Kernel will be introduced, followed by a discussion of the purposes and 
functions of an audit mechanism.   
A. LEAST PRIVILEGE SEPARATION KERNEL 
This section discusses the importance of a high assurance system and the benefits 
of constructing such a system using a Least Privilege Separation Kernel. 
1.  Separation Kernel 
While Commercial off-the-Shelf  (COTS) systems may be sufficient in handling 
the security requirements for general tasks in the private and public sectors, they are not 
designed to protect highly sensitive information. COTS systems are usually not easily 
verifiable, nor are they able to enforce multilevel security policies and address the 
problem of subversion. This is where high assurance trusted computing systems are 
needed. 
One way to design a high assurance system is to put a security kernel at its core. 
A security kernel consists of core security components that will mediate all data flow and 
accesses to resources. It is made up of hardware and software mechanisms that fall within 
the Trusted Computing Base (TCB), which is the totality of all protection mechanism 
responsible for enforcing a security policy. In a security kernel, an internal security label 
is bound to each exported resource and accesses to the resources are mediated according 
to predefined security policies based on these labels. Efforts are usually made to keep the 
security kernel  small enough to be formally verifiable.   
Despite these efforts, some argue that security kernels are too large. Another 
architecture is a separation kernel proposed by Rushby [6].  The idea behind a separation 
kernel is to provide a single system that emulates a number of distributed systems in 
which the components are physically separated into different isolated blocks. Information 
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flow is described at the block level. The kernel can export the resources to separate 
blocks such that the activities in one block will not be visible to other blocks. An 
exception might be when information flow between the two blocks is explicitly allowed 
in the configuration. Isolation of blocks is usually accomplished by virtualization of 
shared resources and implementation of security mechanism controls to enforce policies. 
Security is achieved through this isolation and through the mediation of trusted functions. 
2. Principle of Least Privileged on Separation Kernel 
In a separation kernel, if information flow is explicitly allowed between two 
blocks, all subjects in one block can see all the activities in the other block, even if the 
original intention is to only allow a small subset of the subjects to access a small subset 
of resources in the other block. The problem of describing information flow at the block 
level is that the policy configuration is not granular enough to handle individual subject-
to-resource controls. This limitation means that the information flow configuration in a 
separation kernel is more likely to violate the Principle of Least Privilege [7]. The 
Principle of Least Privilege states that every subject must be able to access only such 
resources that are necessary for its legitimate purpose and nothing more than that. It is 
one of the major design principles that all secure systems should adhere to.  
The Center for Information Systems Security Studies and Research (CISR) at the 
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) is designing and building a separation kernel that will 
support the Principle of Least Privilege; it is referred to as the Least Privilege Separation 
Kernel (LPSK) [2]. The NPS LPSK extends the concept of separation kernels and adds 
mechanisms to allow more granular control. In addition to a policy that describes data 
flow between blocks, the LPSK mediates access based on another overriding subject-
resource flow matrix. A subject is only allowed access to a resource if both the inter-
block data flow policy and the subject-resource flow is allowed. The Principle of Least 
Privilege is fulfilled by granting the least set of privilege to resources in the LPSK. 
3. Common Criteria and Protection Profiles 
A high assurance separation kernel must demonstrably meet its security objectives 
through a thorough and comprehensive evaluation process.  The Common Criteria (CC) 
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[8] provides a framework in which systems can be evaluated to determine whether they 
have met a required level of security functionality and assurance. The CC has been  
jointly developed and recognized as a security standard by many countries. When a 
system is being developed with the intent of meeting CC criteria, the developers target a 
specific Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL). The EAL ranges from EAL1, which is the 
lowest level of assurance in the CC framework, to EAL7.  
The CC paradigm uses protection profiles as high level requirements documents. 
A protection profile contains the security objectives, functional requirements and 
assurance requirements for a particular category of system. The target system will be 
evaluated using the requirements stated in the protection profile. The U.S. Government 
Protection Profile for Separation Kernels in Environments Requiring High Robustness 
(SKPP) [3] contains such requirements for evaluating highly trustworthy separation 
kernels.  
3. Trusted Computing Exemplar (TCX) Project 
Even though the benefits of a high assurance Trusted Computing system are 
obvious, there has been very little work done on such systems in recent years. The 
Trusted Computing Exemplar (TCX) project [3] seeks to fill this gap by providing a 
worked example of a highly trusted computing system. The four main activities of the 
TCX project are: 
 Creation of a prototype framework for rapid high assurance 
system development 
 Development of a reference implementation trusted 
computing component 
 Evaluation of the component for high assurance 
 Open dissemination of deliverables related to the first three 
activities 
A LPSK is being developed as part of the development of a reference 
implementation for the TCX project. This paper attempts to design and implement an 
audit subsystem based on the foundation of the TCX’s LPSK. 
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B. AUDIT OVERVIEW 
Audit is an integral part of any secure system. It generally refers to the 
mechanisms and process of recording, examining and reviewing of security-related 
operations to support organizational requirements for accountability. A document 
produced by the United States National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
that describes minimum security requirements for information systems [9] dictates that 
organizations must “create, protect, and retain information system audit records to the 
extent needed to enable the monitoring, analysis, investigation, and reporting of unlawful, 
unauthorized, or inappropriate information system activity”. It also requires organizations 
to “ensure that the actions of individual information system users can be uniquely traced 
to those users so they can be held accountable for their actions.” The purpose of audit 
actually extends far beyond ensuring accountability. This section  summarizes some of 
the objectives of a good audit subsystem  
1. Purpose of Audit 
A good logging mechanism will facilitate the review of access patterns to 
individual objects [10]. An audit system must be able to facilitate the discovery of 
attempts by intruders to bypass the protection mechanisms, such as failed login attempts. 
This can be accomplished by regular inspections of the audit log by a security officer. 
The audit system can also act as a building block for other security components such as 
an intrusion detection system, which performs near real-time automated analysis of audit 
information to detect malicious attacks. 
To protect against insider threats, the audit mechanism must also allow for the 
discovery of usages patterns that have violated or could be leading to a violation of an 
organization’s security policies [10]. It can also be used to monitor attempts to exploit 
covert channels. To provide these services, the audit mechanism must be able to track all 
users’ operations and the privileges they are assuming. 
A good audit system can also act as a deterrent to potential attackers. Such 
individuals are less likely to carry out any malicious acts on the system if they know that 
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all their activities will be detected and recorded by the audit system. To the system 
owners, a good audit system also acts as a form of assurance that potential malicious 
activity will be discovered. 
Besides contributing to security, a good audit mechanism also makes it easier for 
system developers and operators to troubleshoot the system in the event of system 
malfunction [11].  An administrator can review the audit logs to piece together 
information that can help him reconstruct the sequence of events, to identify what went 
wrong, and then potentially what needs to be corrected 
2. Log Management Architecture 
To be able to accomplish the goals of the audit subsystem, an effective way of 
generating, collecting and reviewing logs must be in place. A log management 
architecture addresses these issues by looking at ways to organize the various 
components to process and store audit information. A typical log management 
architecture usually consists of the following 3 tiers [12]: 
 1st Tier: Log Generation. Audit services run in the individual host/device to 
generate audit records. Audit mechanisms are usually part of the TCB of the 
system to ensure that they are tamper-proof, always invoked and verifiable. 
The events to be audited may be configurable to allow granular control over 
the amount of log information to be generated. There is a tradeoff decision 
that needs to be made when configuring audit, because a large number of 
generated audit records will provide more analytical data, but it will also 
require more CPU time and storage space, and may make it possible to hide 
malicious activity within an overwhelming amount of non-malicious activity. 
The audit services will make the log data available to log servers in the second 
tier through a protected network connection or other secure means.   
 2nd Tier: Log Analysis and Storage. This tier consists of log servers capable 
of collecting and storing log data from multiple hosts. Log data can be stored 
on the log servers themselves or on separate database servers. 
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 3rd Tier: Log Monitoring. This tier consists of consoles and tools that allow 
operators to monitor and review log data Tools can range from simple 
applications that allow operators to search and display audit records to IDS 
applications that perform real time monitoring of events.  
The focus of this paper is to design the first tier log generation mechanism of the LPSK 
and to make provisions for the log data to be stored and retrieved for review in the second 
and third tiers of a log management architecture. 
3. Audit Records Standard 
An auditing system records important system events, where the data associated 
with each event is saved in the form of some kind of record.  Even though most modern 
systems implement some form of audit, the industry as a whole lacks standards on the 
format of the audit records. A review of the formats used by the major operating systems 
today shows that almost all systems use their own proprietary audit record formats. This 
incompatibility often results in difficulties in log management, especially when events 
from different systems need to be combined [12]. This paper will give a more thorough 
discussion of the pros and cons of the different types of audit record format in Chapter 4. 
C.  SUMMARY 
This chapter has provided background on the basic principles of the LPSK and 
how it contributes to the construction of high assurance systems. It has also given an 
overview of the purpose for the architecture of audit mechanisms for such a system. 
 11
III. REQUIREMENTS  
The TCX LPSK functional specification [5] includes a list of requirements for its 
audit subsystem. As the LPSK is designed to be compliant with the SKPP [3], its audit 
subsystem must also fulfill the requirements of the SKPP. Below is a list of items that are 
mentioned in the TCX LPSK functional specifications and SKPP: 
 Security audit event selection, 
 Security audit automatic response, 
 Security audit data generation, and 
 Security audit review 
Each of the above will be described in greater detail below. 
A. SECURITY AUDIT EVENT SELECTION 
Logging too little information is definitely not desirable, but logging too much 
may also be a problem. Logging will increase system overhead in terms of both storage 
space and processor time. This may result in a reduction in performance and significant 
reduction of storage space available for other processes in a system having tight resource 
constraints. Having too much audit log information may also increase the time needed for 
the operators to review the audit data. Thus, there is a need for the audit subsystem to 
offer the flexibility for administrators to specify the level of logging to be done on the 
system. This should be determined based on the operational requirements. 
In the LPSK, the granularity of auditable events is defined using a configuration 
vector. A configuration vector is read by the LPSK during the kernel initialization phase 
and contains a set of information that describes the initial secure state of the LPSK 
platform and how the LPSK shall behave during the run-time. It also contains 
configurable options for the audit subsystem.  
The SKPP requires that the separation kernel be able to include or exclude events 
from the runtime audited events based on the following attributes: 
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 Resource identity, 
 Subject identity, 
 Event type, 
 Success of auditable security events, and 
 Failure of auditable security events 
Table 1 shows the optional auditable events that can be switched on or off based 
on the different choices in the configuration vector. 
Table 1.   Auditable Events via a Configuration Vector 
Auditable Events Attributes 
When a signal is sent by a particular subject (success, 
failure, or both) 
Subject identity 
When a signal is received by a particular subject Subject identity 
When a software interrupt is invoked by a particular 
subject 
Subject identity 
When a device read is requested by a particular subject 
(success, failure, or both) 
Subject identity 
When a device write is requested by a particular subject 
(success, failure, or both) 
Subject identity 
When a device configuration is requested by a particular 
subject (success, failure, or both) 
Subject identity 
When the read of an eventcount is requested by a 
particular subject (success, failure, or both) 
Subject identity 
When the advance of an eventcount is requested by a 
particular subject (success, failure, or both) 
Subject identity 
When an await on an eventcount is requested by a 
particular subject (success, failure, or both) 
Subject identity 
When  a  process awakes from an await on an 
eventcount 
Subject identity 
When the ticket of a sequencer is requested by a 
particular subject (success, failure, or both) 
Subject identity 
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When a read operation of a particular device is requested 
(success, failure, or both) 
Device identity 
When a write operation of a particular device is 
requested (success, failure, or both) 
Device identity 
When a configuration operation for a particular device is 
requested (success, failure, or both) 
Device identity 
When a ticket of a sequencer is requested (success, 
failure, or both). 
Sequencer Event 
When an advance of an eventcount is requested 
(success, failure, or both) 
Eventcount Event 
When a read of an eventcount is requested (success, 
failure, or both) 
Eventcount Event 
When an await on an eventcount is requested (success, 
failure, or both) 
Eventcount Event 
When a wakeup on an eventcount occurs. Eventcount Event 
When a particular segment is swapped in (success, 
failure, or both) 
Memory segment Event 
When a particular segment is flushed (success, failure, 
or both) 
Memory segment Event 
When a particular segment is swapped out (success, 
failure, or both) 
Memory segment Event 
When an mseg is created Memory segment Event 
 
Other configurable audit attributes in the configuration vector include: 
 Enabling or disabling of audit 
 Size of the audit buffer 
 Action when audit buffer is full 
o Overwrite oldest record, 
o Halt the system, or 
o Shutdown the system 
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B. SECURITY AUDIT AUTOMATIC RESPONSE 
The SKPP requires that the LPSK run a suite of self tests to verify both the 
hardware and software components of the kernel during start-up, periodically during 
normal operation, and during recovery. The audit subsystem shall record each of the 
failures and if required, the actions taken by the LPSK to recover from the failure. The 
audit subsystem may also be required to perform special actions such as halting the 
system upon detection of a critical failure during both the LPSK initialization and run-
time phases. Table 2 shows a list of actions to be performed by the audit subsystem. 
Table 2.   Special Actions Taken by Audit Subsystem 
Events Actions to be taken by audit subsystem 
Any audited event that causes the LPSK to 
halt the system 
Display an informative message on the 
screen prior to the halt 
Size of the audit buffer is specified outside 
the valid range 
Display an informative message on the 
screen and halt the system 
Failure of LPSK self-test Record actions taken by the LPSK to try to 
correct the failure 
Unsuccessful binding of security attributes 
to individual partitions 
Display an informative message on the 
screen and halt the system 
Attempt to recover the LPSK to a secure 
state 
Record actions taken by the LPSK to try to 
recover (or halt the system) 
Detection of invalid value or set of values 
in binary configuration vector during LPSK 
initialization 
Halt the system 
Inability of LPSK to return to a secure state 
after failure of a security function 
Halt the system 
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C. SECURITY AUDIT DATA GENERATION 
Based on the SKPP and LPSK requirements, a list of events has been identified as 
auditable. The audit subsystem shall be able to generate an audit record for each auditable 
event. In addition to the optional auditable events mentioned in section A, the following 
is a  list of mandatory events that must be audited if audit is enabled in the configuration 
vector. 
 Values of configuration vector 
 Unsuccessful binding of security attributes to individual partitions, subjects, 
and non-subject exported resources 
 The assignment of a default value to the configuration data during LPSK 
initialization 
 The detection during LPSK initialization of an invalid value or set of values in 
a binary configuration vector 
 The successful completion of LPSK initialization 
 Successful start-up and shutdown of the LPSK audit mechanism by the LPSK 
Initializer 
 Actions taken because of a failure of an LPSK self-test 
 All requests for a configuration change 
 The success of each startup of the LPSK 
 A failure of an LPSK self test 
 Any detected loss of secure state. 
 Action taken to attempt to recover the LPSK to a secure state 
 The inability of the LPSK to return to a secure state after failure of a security 
function. 
 Changes to the LPSK time source 
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 Detection of a SAK invocation. 
 The shutdown, power down or halt of a platform. 
 Detection of duplicate MAC addresses 
D. SECURITY AUDIT REVIEW 
Audit records may contain sensitive information about the system. Thus, the audit 
services shall ensure that the records are only exported to authorized subjects. The audit 
subsystem shall store the audit records in an internal audit buffer and provide an external 
interface so that authorized subjects  may obtain the buffered audit records. The LPSK 
functional specification requires the audit subsystem to provide call interfaces to retrieve 
the following information: 
 Size of the audit buffer, 
 Oldest buffered audit record, and 
 Audit statistics 
o Number of audit records overwritten 
o Number of audit records generated 
Audit records are not useful if they cannot be reviewed in a timely manner. To 
ensure that the relevant parties are able to interpret each audit record, a standard audit 
record format shall be defined and used consistently in the system. This record format 
shall be properly documented and made available to all relevant parties that need to 
handle audit records. 
The SKPP also mandates that an audit record shall minimally contain the 
following information: 
 Data and time of an event, 
 Type of an event, 
 Subject Identity, 
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 Success or failure of the event, and 
 The identity of the relevant resource (where applicable) 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter provided an overview of the various requirements for the LPSK audit 
subsystem based on the SKPP and TCX LPSK functional specification documents. A 
design and implementation to address the requirements is discussed in the next chapter.  
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IV. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 
This chapter starts with an overview of the design of the audit subsystem 
components. It is followed by a discussion on the audit record format and design of the 
audit record generation and collection. The fourth section describes the implementation 
of the audit module interfaces. The last section describes the implementation of the 
kernel’s audit buffer.   
A. HIGH LEVEL DESIGN 
This section presents a high level view of the LPSK audit subsystem and 
discusses the considerations and choices made in the design of the audit subsystem and 
its various components. 
1.  Overview 
Figure 1 shows a high level overview of the interactions between the audit 
subsystem modules and the other system components.   
 
 
Figure 1.   High Level Overview of Audit Subsystem 
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The LPSK platform is based on an Intel x86 processor, which consists of 4 
Privilege Levels (PL), ranging from PL0, which is the most privileged, to PL3, which is 
the least privileged. The LPSK audit subsystem resides in PL0. The audit events are 
detected by other kernel modules, which then communicates relevant event information 
to the audit subsystem through a module interface.  
The Audit Collector module receives the audit request from the kernel functions 
and determines whether to record the audit information based on the configured audit 
policy. If the event is to be audited, the Audit Collector module will format the audit 
record in the appropriate binary format and send it to the Audit Buffer.  
The Audit Buffer provides temporary storage for the audit records before they are 
read by an authorized subject and transferred to a log file in a secondary storage space. 
Due to the limited space in the Audit Buffer, old records that have been read by an 
authorized subject are erased from the Audit Buffer so that memory space can be reused 
to store new records. 
The Audit Retrieval and Viewing Application currently resides in PL3 so that it is 
able to make full use of the richer range of services from the underlying layers to provide 
a user interface to an administrator to view and manage audit records.  The Retrieval and 
Viewing Application issues requests to the Audit Collector module which will then 
retrieve the oldest record from the Audit Buffer and forward it to the application for 
further processing. 
2. Starting and Stopping the Audit Subsystem 




Figure 2.   Audit Subsystem Life Cycle 
1. The user selects a configuration vector for the LPSK. The LPSK Initializer 
will read the binary data of the configuration vector and configure the system 
state according to what is specified inside the configuration vector. 
2. The LPSK Initializer will start the Audit Collector, passing configuration data 
to it. The configuration vector contains information such as the size of the 
Audit Buffer and types of events to be audited.  
3. The Audit Collector initializes its internal variables and creates an audit buffer 
based on values specified in the configuration vector.  
4. The Audit Collector will then enter into the ready state and is able to accept 
audit requests. Because the Audit Collector needs to start collecting records 
during the LPSK initialization phase, it must be started at the earliest possible 
stage. 
5. The Audit Collector will continue to respond to audit requests throughout the 
entire LPSK runtime phase and during the LPSK shutdown phase. In order to 
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give ample time for the Audit Retrieval to retrieve all the records that are 
remaining in the Audit Buffer, the Auditor Collector should be among the last 
processes to shutdown [5].  In addition, the Audit Collector can also initiate a 
time delay before shutting down the audit subsystem. The value of the time 
delay can be configured in the configuration vector. 
B. AUDIT RECORD FORMATS 
A standard audit log format is important to allow the different components of a 
system to exchange and interpret audit records correctly. However, a survey of audit log 
formats used by the common operating systems shows that most of them use different 
proprietary formats. There is no de facto standard in the industry today. The many 
different types of log formats in use today include text-based, Extensible Markup 
Language (XML) [13], databases and binary files. Some of these formats (such as text-
based and XML files) are designed to be read by humans, while others (such as databases 
and binary files) are not. The section below provides a discussion and comparison of the 
popular types of log formats. Criteria for audit format selection for the LPSK are 
discussed. This is followed by discussion of the LPSK audit record format. 
1. Types of Audit Record Format 
The various types of audit record formats are described below. 
a. Syslog  
Text-based formats can be in the form of a comma-separated or tab-
separated text file, which can be proprietary in nature or it can follow the syslog format 
[14]. Syslog was initially developed as part of the Sendmail project [15] but due to its 
ease of use, has been widely used by many applications, especially in UNIX systems.  
A syslog record consists of 3 parts. The first part contains the identity of 
the source and severity level. The second part contains a timestamp and the hostname 
while the third part contains the actual log message content. There are, however, no 
standards for what information is required or how the information should be formatted. It 
is usually just a string of text that describes what happened. While this provides the 
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flexibility to decide what information to include inside the content, different 
implementations may lead to a difficulty in interpreting the log entries. This greatly limits 
its potential use as a standard log format for audit log exchange among different systems. 
The fact that the log content is in text format means that while they are 
highly readable by humans, log records cannot be easily parsed by machines. Processing 
and filtering of syslog records based on the attributes of the events can be challenging. A 
text-based format also takes up much more space compared to a binary format. This 
could cause significant problems for platforms with limited resources, such as handheld 
devices.  
b. XML 
XML [13] is a markup language to represent text data in a well-structured 
way. It is still text-based, but due to the highly structured nature of an XML document, it 
is meant to be both human-readable and parseable by machines. It is generally used to 
exchange information among different applications. The advantages of logging in XML 
format include ease of viewing, processing, and is well understood by many applications. 
There is, however, a lack of an open standard on a XML log formats. XML files also take 
up much more space than a binary file and require a high amount of computational 
resources to parse the file, making it a poor choice for platforms with limited resources. 
c. Database 
Logs can be stored directly into relational databases. Databases provide 
advanced indexing and search capabilities that text or binary log files are not able to 
provide. But the need for a database server means that it is highly unlikely to be used as a 
native log format in the kernel. It is more suitable to be used by higher level applications 
rather than by operating systems.  
d. Binary Format 
A binary format is commonly used by the major operating systems. Some 
of the examples are Event Log File Format [16] used by Microsoft Windows operating 
systems and Basic Security Module (BSM) [17] used by Solaris. The main advantage of a 
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binary log file is that it is small when compared to a text-based format. It is also highly 
flexible with regard to the type of data that it can store. Also, binary logs can be 
formatted in a way that allows for easy parsing by machines. The main drawback of a 
binary format is that it requires a log viewer application to translate the binary bits to 
human-readable text so that the administrator can review the logs. 
2. Selection of an Audit Log Format for LPSK 
In this section, the criteria for selection of the LPK audit record format are 
presented and audit record types are compared for suitability in the LPSK. 
One of the most important factors when considering an audit log format for the 
LPSK is that it must be lightweight in terms of both storage and computational resources. 
A kernel should be small and contain only the essential services. Making the audit log 
small and simple also allows the deployment of the LPSK on handheld devices that have 
limited storage and computational resources. 
Based on the survey of the different log formats, binary logs have been selected as 
the best choice for the LPSK because the amount of space required for collection of audit 
records is significantly smaller than the other log formats, and the binary format can be 
parsed easily. The Syslog and XML formats are attractive options for remote logging 
when logs need to be transferred from multiple hosts to a central log server. The binary 
logs collected by the LPSK can be converted to these formats at a later stage if there is 
such a requirement. Solaris also takes a similar approach by providing a praudit [17] 
utility to convert BSM audit records to human-readable text or XML format when 
required. A database can also be used to store audit records in a remote log server. Table 






Table 3.   Comparison of Different Audit Log Format 
 Syslog XML Database Binary 
Human-
Readable 
Yes Yes No No 
Easily 
Parseable 




Yes Yes No No 




Low High High Low 
 
3. LPSK Audit Record Format  
Details of the LPSK audit record format are presented in this subsection. 
a. Overview 
After comparing the different audit record formats, a binary based log 
format was chosen as the format for the LPSK. A study was conducted to determine 
whether any of the existing binary audit record formats can be used directly by the LPSK, 
but none of them is entirely suitable because most are designed to work in a specific 
operating system environment. For example, BSM includes classes of log records 
describing events related to the UNIX file system that are not relevant in the LPSK. 
Similarly, there are events specific to the LPSK that cannot be described by any of the 
existing audit record formats. Thus, there is a need to design a set of record formats 
specifically for the LPSK. The BSM Format was used as a reference model when 
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designing the audit log format for the LPSK due to the fact that it is flexible and simple to 
implement, and that the LPSK can benefit from its design.  
b. Audit Record Structure 
Each audit record represents an event that has been selected for auditing 
according to the configuration vector. An audit record is made up of a sequence of 
tokens, each describing an attribute of the event that the audit record describes. Each 
record begins with a header token and ends with a trailer token. There could be one or 
more tokens of other types in between the header and trailer tokens.  
Each token starts with a one-byte token identifier, which indicates the type 
of attributes the token carries. There could be one or more attributes in the token 
depending on the token type. As a result, the length of each type of token varies. The 
varying token length approach of the audit record format allows a high degree of 
flexibility in constructing records for different types of events with different attributes. It 
also ensures that no space is wasted as in the case of a fixed length record that allocates 
the maximum amount of storage space for each record. This helps to keep the audit log 
small. 
The following is an example of an audit record that describes the detection 
of a Secure Attention Key (SAK) invocation. 
13 bytes 2 bytes 5 bytes 
Header Token Partition Token Trailer Token 
The header token contains the event identifier, timestamp and the length of 
the entire record. The event identifier indicates the type of event the record describes. The 
partition token contains information about the partition from which the SAK is invoked 




A total of 17 tokens have been defined in order to describe the various 
auditable LPSK events. A header token and a trailer token will be found in all audit 
records. The other tokens are used when additional attributes are required in the record. 
Each token starts with a one-byte unique token identifier to allow the parser to know the 
type of data that follows. Table 4 shows the LPSK token identifiers. 
Table 4.   Token Identifier 
Token Token Identifier (in hexadecimal) 
Header Token 0x00 
Trailer Token 0xFF 
Argument Token 0x10 
Configuration Vector Token 0x11 
Device Token 0x12 
Dseg Token 0x13 
Eventcount Token 0x14 
Interrupt Token 0x15 
MAC Token 0x16 
Mseg Token 0x17 
Partition Token 0x18 
Process Token 0x19 
Return Token 0x1A 
Sequence Token 0x1B 
Signal Token 0x1C 
Subject Token 0x1D 
Text Token 0x1E 
 28
The following subsections describe each token in more detail 
(1) Header Token. A header token marks the beginning of each 
audit record. It contains the following fields in the order that they are listed. 
 Header token identifier (1 byte), 
 Audit record length, in bytes (2 bytes), 
 Audit  record structure version number (2 bytes), 
 Event identifier to indicate the type of audit event 
 Event modifier to provide additional information about the 
event (2 bytes), and 
 Timestamp of the creation of the audit record (4 bytes) 












Figure 3.   Header Token 
The header token identifier is given a predefined value of 0. Audit 
record length stores the total number of bytes the entire record contains, including the 
header and the trailer tokens. As the length of each record varies, audit record length 
allows the parser to know how many bytes to read for the record. The version number is 
set aside to facilitate future modification to the record structure, so that a parser can parse 
newer and older record structures. 
Each type of auditable event is described using a unique event 
identifier. The event modifier is used as an additional flag to provide more detailed 
descriptions of the events. For example, when recording the “successful start-up and 
shutdown of LPSK audit mechanism”, a modifier with a value of zero (0) indicates that it 
is a start-up event, while a modifier with a value of one (1) indicates that it is a shutdown 
event.  
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The LPSK uses the number of seconds since the start of the IEEE 
POSIX epoch [18] to keep track of date and time for its kernel. The epoch time system 
records date and time in terms of number of seconds elapsed since January 1 1970 
00:00:00 UTC. Using 4 bytes for the timestamp means this audit record structure can 
keep track of time till the year 2106. 
 
(2) Trailer Token. The trailer token marks the end of a record. 
It contains the following fields in the order that they are listed. 
 Trailer token identifier (1 byte),  
 Audit record length, in bytes (2 bytes), 
 CRC32 checksum of the entire record (4 bytes) 
1 byte 2 bytes 4 bytes 
Token identifier Record length CRC32 checksum 
Figure 4.   Trailer Token 
The record length is contained in both the header and trailer 
tokens. The purpose of this redundancy is to allow for the forward and backward parsing 
of the records. The CRC32 checksum is appended to the end of each record to support 
checks for accidental corruption of the record. 
 
(3) Argument Token. The argument token contains information 
about argument values passed to a kernel function. It contains the following fields in the 
order that they are listed. 
 Argument token identifier (1 byte), 
 Argument identifier (1 byte), 
 Argument value (4 bytes), 
 Length of optional text descriptive text string (1 byte), and 
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 Optional text string (n bytes where 0 ≤ n ≤ 255) 
1 byte 1 byte 4 bytes 1 byte n bytes 
Token identifier Argument 
identifier 
Argument value Text length Text 
Figure 5.   Argument Token 
A function call may contain several parameters. Thus, an audit 
record may also contain several argument tokens. In this case, the argument identifier 
indicates which parameter it corresponds to. The optional text string provides the 
flexibility of adding text descriptions to the arguments if needed. 
(4) Configuration Vector Token. The configuration vector 
token contains information to identify the configuration vector used to initialize the 
LPSK. It contains the following fields in the order that they are listed. 
 Configuration vector token identifier (1 byte), 
 Text length (1 byte), 
 Descriptive text (n bytes where 0 ≤ n ≤ 255), and 
 MD5 hash (16 bytes) 
1 byte 1 byte n bytes 16 bytes 
Token identifier Text length Descriptive text MD5 hash 
Figure 6.   Configuration Vector Token 
The descriptive text contains the human readable description of the 
configuration vector. The MD5 hash value of the entire binary configuration vector 




(5) Device Token. The device token contains information 
about the device. It contains the following fields in the order that they are listed. 
 Device token identifier (1 byte), 
 Major number (1 byte), 
 Minor number (1 byte), 
 Type (1 byte), and  
 Partition ID (1 byte) 
1 byte 1 byte 1 byte 1 byte 1 byte 
Token identifier Major number Minor number Type Partition ID 
Figure 7.   Device Token 
The major number indicates the device category. The minor 
number refers to the specific instantiation of a device. The type attributes can be either 
CONTROL or DATA depending on how the device was accessed. The partition ID is the 
home partition of the device. 
(6) Dseg Token. The dseg token contains information about the 
data segments. It contains the following fields in the order that they are listed. 
 Dseg token identifier (1 byte), 
 Privilege level assigned to dseg (1 byte), 
 Partition ID (1 byte), 
 Path length (1 byte), and 





1 byte 1 byte 1 byte 1 byte n bytes 
Token identifier Privilege level Partition ID Path length Path 
Figure 8.   Dseg Token 
A dseg is a data segment in a process’ address space that is 
initialized from a secondary storage segment. The maximum number of dsegs defined in 
the LPSK specification is 64. Each dseg is identified by a unique identifier. The privilege 
level is the Intel PL to which the dseg was allocated during initialization. The partition ID 
is the home partition of dseg. The path attribute contains the path to the secondary storage 
segment, while the path length indicates the length of the path.  
(7) Eventcount Token. The evencount token contains 
information about the eventcount. It contains the following fields in the order that they 
are listed. 
 Eventcount token identifier (1 byte), 
 Eventcount ID, and 
 Eventcount value 
1 byte 1 byte 4 bytes 
Token identifier Eventcount ID Eventcount value 
Figure 9.   Eventcount Token 
The eventcount is used for inter-process synchronization. A 
maximum of 64 platform-wide eventcounts is possible, and each has a unique eventcount 
ID and stores a 32-bit number. The eventcount value is the value of the eventcount at the 
time of the audited event. 
(8) Interrupt Token. The interrupt token contains information 
about the interrupts. The Intel x86 architecture provides a total of 256 interrupts, where 
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each is identified by a unique interrupt number. The token contains the following fields in 
the order that they are listed. 
 Interrupt token identifier (1 byte), and 
 Interrupt number (1 byte) 
1 byte 1 byte 
Token identifier Interrupt number 
Figure 10.   Interrupt Token 
(9) MAC Token. The MAC Token contains information about 
the Media Access Control (MAC) address. It contains the following fields in the order 
that they are listed. 
 MAC token identifier (1 byte), and 
 MAC address (6 bytes) 
1 byte 6 bytes 
Token identifier MAC address 
Figure 11.   MAC Token 
(10) Mseg Token. The Mseg token contains information about 
the memory segment. It contains the following fields in the order that they are listed. 
 Mseg token identifier (1 byte), 
 Mseg identifier (1byte), 
 Size of the mseg (4 bytes), 
 Privilege level assigned to mseg (1 byte), and 
 Partition ID (1 byte) 
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1 byte 1 byte 4 bytes 1 byte 1 byte 
Token identifier Mseg identifier Size Privilege level Partition ID 
Figure 12.   Mseg Token 
An mseg is an Intel x86 data segment that is created in a process’ 
address space. The maximum number of msegs defined in the LPSK specification is 32. 
Each mseg is identified by a unique identifier. The size is specified during initialization. 
The privilege level is the Intel PL to which the mseg was allocated during initialization. 
The partition ID refers to the home partition that the mseg belongs to. 
(11) Partition Token. A partition token contains information to 
identify a partition. It contains the following fields in the order that they are listed. 
 Partition token identifier (1 byte),  and 
 Partition ID (1 byte) 
 
1 byte 1 byte 
Token identifier Partition ID 
Figure 13.   Partition Token 
The maximum number of partitions defined in the LPSK 
specification is 256. Each partition is identified by a unique identifier called the partition 
ID. 
(12) Process Token. A process token contains information to 
identify a process. It contains the following fields in the order that they are listed. 
 Process token identifier (1 byte), 
 Partition ID (1 byte), and 
 Process Identifier (1 byte) 
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1 byte 1 byte 4 bytes 
Token identifier Partition ID Process identifier 
Figure 14.   Process Token 
(13) Return Token. The return token contains the return status of 
a kernel function call. It contains the following fields in the order that they are listed. 
 Return token identifier (1 byte), and 
 Return value (4 bytes) 
 
1 byte 4 bytes 
Token identifier Return value 
Figure 15.   Return Token 
(14) Sequencer Token. The sequencer token contains 
information to identify a sequencer. It contains the following fields in the order that they 
are listed. 
 Sequencer token identifier (1 byte), 
 Sequencer identifier (1 byte), and 
 Sequencer value (4 bytes) 
 
1 byte 1 byte 4 bytes 
Token identifier Sequencer identifier Sequencer value 
Figure 16.   Sequence Token 
A sequencer is used for inter-process synchronization. A maximum 
of 64 platform-wide sequencers is possible in the LPSK. Each is identified by a unique 
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identifier. The sequencer value is the value of the sequencer at the time of the audited 
event. 
(15) Signal Token. The signal token contains information to 
identify a signal channel. It contains the following fields in the order that they are listed. 
 Signal token identifier (1 byte), and 
 Signal channel identifier (1 byte) 
 
1 byte 1 byte 
Token identifier Signal channel identifier 
Figure 17.   Signal Token 
A signal is an abstract communication mechanism implemented by 
the LPSK to allow a subject to communicate with another subject via the recipient’s 
signal channel. Each subject can have a maximum of 32 signal channels. A signal token 
is usually used together with subject tokens to provide information about the sender and 
receiver of a signal. 
(16) Subject Token. The subject token contains information to 
identify a subject. It contains the following fields in the order that they are listed. 
 Subject token identifier (1 byte), 
 Partition ID (1 byte), 
 Process identifier (4 bytes), and 
 Hardware Privilege level (1 byte) 
 
1 byte 1 byte 4 bytes 1 byte 
Token identifier Partition ID Process Identifier Hardware Privilege 
level 
 37
Figure 18.   Subject Token 
 
 
The hardware privilege level is the Intel PL to which the subject 
was allocated during initialization. 
(17) Text Token. The text token describes a text string. It 
contains the following fields in the order that they are listed. 
 Text token identifier (1 byte), 
 Length of the text string (1 byte), and 
 Text string (n bytes where 0 ≤ n ≤ 255) 
 
1 byte 1 byte n bytes 
Token identifier Length of text Text 
Figure 19.   Text Token 
4. Event Classes and Identifier 
There are altogether 45 auditable events, and each of them has a unique two-byte 
event identifier. They are categorized into a number of different classes for ease of 
management. The first byte of the event identifier indicates the class and the second byte 
indicates the event number within the class.  For example, the event “successful 
completion of LPSK initialization” belongs to the Initilization class and has a class 
identifier of 1. As it is the 5th event within the class, it is being assigned an event 








Table 5.   Event Classes 
Class Name Description Class Identifier 
(in hexadecimal) 
Initialization Events that occur during the initialization 
phase of the LPSK 
0x01 
System System-wide events that occur during the 
runtime phase of the LPSK 
0x02 
Device Events related to devices 0x03 
Process Events related to process management 0x04 
Memory Events related to memory management 0x05 
Synchronization Events related to resources used for 




Table 6 shows the list of events in the Initialization class, their corresponding 











Table 6.   Events in Initialization Class 








Unsuccessful binding of security attributes to individual 




The assignment of a default value to the configuration 






The detection during LPSK initialization of an invalid 








Table 7 shows the list of events in the System class, their corresponding event 








Table 7.   Events in System Class 




Successful start-up and shutdown of the LPSK audit 
mechanism by the LPSK Initializer. (Event modifier: 0 





Actions taken because of a failure of an LPSK self-test.  














The success of each startup of the LPSK. header 
trailer 
0x0204 




















The inability of the LPSK to return to a secure state after 




















The shutdown, powerdown or halt of a platform. (Event 
modifier: 0 indicates a shutdown, 1 indicates a 








Table 8 shows the list of events in the Device class, their corresponding event 







Table 8.   Events in Device Class 




When a read operation of a particular device is requested 








When a write operation of a particular device is 








When a read meta-data operation for a particular device 









When a write meta-data operation for a particular device 














When a device read is requested by a particular subject. 








When a device write is requested by a particular subject. 








When a device configuration is requested by a particular 











Table 9 shows the list of events in the Process class, their corresponding event 
identifiers and sequence of tokens used to construct them. 
Table 9.   Events in the Process Class 














When a signal is sent by a particular subject (success, 
























Table 10 shows the list of events in the Memory class, their corresponding event 
identifiers and the sequence of tokens used to construct them. 
Table 10.   Events in the Memory Class 
















When a particular segment is swapped in (success, 


















When a particular segment is swapped out (success, 

















Table 11 shows the list of events in the Synchronization class, their corresponding 
event identifiers and the sequence of tokens used to construct them. 
Table 11.   Events in the Synchronization Class 





When a process awakes from an await on an eventcount 







When an advance of an eventcount is requested 







When a read of an eventcount is requested (success, 







When an awake of an eventcount is requested (success, 







When a wakeup on an eventcount is requested (success, 








When a ticket of a sequencer is requested (success, 







When the read of an eventcount is requested by a 







When an advance of an eventcount is requested by a 








When an await on an eventcount is requested by a 








When the ticket of a sequencer is requested by a header 0x060A 
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C. DESIGN OF AUDIT GENERATION AND COLLECTION 
An overview of the processes involved in the generation and collection of audit 
records is presented. This is followed by a discussion of the design considerations in the 
proposed workflow. 
1. Overview 
The following is the flow of events during the audit generation and collection 
phase: 
 A kernel module reaches a potential audit event generation point, usually 
just before the return statement inside the relevant kernel function. It 
invokes a function call to the audit subsystem to check whether the audit is 
enabled. The audit subsystem replies with a predetermined return value. 
 If audit is disabled, the kernel module will not perform any audit 
generation operations. If audit is enabled, the kernel module will gather 
the necessary event information and send it to the audit subsystem through 
a function call.   
 The audit subsystem will format the event information into the correct 
token format, append header and trailer tokens, and write the record into 
the Audit Buffer.  
2. Determination of Auditable Events  
The configuration vector provides the flexibility for an administrator to customize 
the audit policy according to operational needs. The administrator can decide which audit 
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events are to be generated and written to the audit logs. Thus, at the audit generation and 
collection phase, there must also be a mechanism for the system to perform a check of the 
audit policy to decide whether the event should be audited. 
A few approaches have been considered: 
1. The kernel modules are individually responsible for storing audit policy 
related to their functionality, which allows the individual modules to 
determine whether a potential event is auditable before invoking any function 
calls to the audit subsystem. However, this means that potential audit event 
decision points are spread throughout the kernel code. The lack of a common 
module to perform the checking spreads the audit policy across many modules 
and may result in difficulty in management of the audit policy code. 
2.  Kernel modules will always send all audit event information to the audit 
subsystem. The audit subsystem is responsible for determining whether the 
event is auditable. The advantage of this approach is the ease of management 
of code as all audit configurations are maintained within the audit module. 
However, there could be a potential performance issue as all event 
information will be sent to the audit subsystem regardless of whether the 
events should be audited or not, or whether auditing has been disabled 
completely per the configuration vector.  
3. The audit subsystem provides an interface to other kernel modules to allow 
them to check whether a particular event should be audited before sending all 
the event information. However, in this case, the audit subsystem still needs 
most of the event information to decide whether the event is auditable. 
Ultimately, there might not be any significant improvement over Option 2. 
4. Audit subsystem provides an interface to other kernel modules to allow them 
to check whether audit is enabled. This helps to reduce the amount of 
unnecessary event data transferred in the event that audit is disabled. 
Option 4 combined with Option 2 were selected and implemented in this research 
because it provides a balanced approach by not requiring kernel modules to perform their 
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own audit policy checking while still eliminating unnecessary function calls when audit is 
disabled. Future work is needed to assess the performance impact of Option 2 before 
deciding the best way to perform the audit policy checking.  
3. Audit Module Interfaces 
In order for the LPSK modules to communicate with the audit subsystems, a set 
of application programming interfaces (API) must be provided by the audit subsystem. 
Ideally, one common interface can be used by all LPSK modules to send event 
information to the audit subsystem. However, that is impractical because the relevant 
information differs from event to event. Such a one-size-fits-all interface would require 
the interface to support all possible parameters, even though only a few would be used for 
most events. A more practical approach is to provide a separate interface for each type of 
event. Detailed discussions of the implementation of the interfaces are presented in 
Section 4. 
 Even with a separate interface for each type of event, the parameter list can still 
be very long for some events. For easy management, a structure type is defined for each 
type of token and the event information is encapsulated inside the token structure type.  
Pointers to the structure types are passed as parameters to the audit subsystem. This helps 
to keep the list of parameters small. The use of typed structures enhances 
understandability and makes it easier to make amendments in the future.  
 D. AUDIT MODULE INTERFACES IMPLEMENTATION 
The LPSK audit module prototype was developed using the C programming 
language. The implementation of the interfaces is discussed next. 
1. Interfaces to Kernel Modules 
Table 12 shows the structure types defined for the different types of tokens. Event 
information is stored in these structure types and pointers to them are passed as 




Table 12.   Structure Types for Tokens 
Structure Type Descriptions 
typedef struct { 
    unsigned char arg_id; 
    unsigned int arg_val;  
    unsigned char txt_len;  
    unsigned char txt[256];  
} audit_token_argument_t; 
 
Structure type for argument token 
 arg_id refers to the argument identifier  
 arg_val refers to the argument value 
 txt_len refers to the length of optional 
descriptive text string 
 txt refers to the optional descriptive text 
typedef struct { 
    unsigned char txt_len;  
    unsigned char txt[256];  
    unsigned int size;  






Structure type for configuration vector token 
 txt_len refers to the length of the configuration 
vector descriptive text 
 txt refers to the configuration vector descriptive 
text 
 size refers to the size of the configuration vector 
 md5hash refers to the MD5 hash value of the 
binary configuration vector 
typedef struct { 
    unsigned char major; 
    unsigned char minor;  
    unsigned char type; 
    unsigned char part_id; 
} audit_token_device_t; 
Structure type for device token 
 major_num refers to the major number of the 
device 
 minor_num refers to the minor number of the 
device 
 type refers to the type of device 
 part-id refers to the partition ID of the device 
 
typedef struct { Structure type for dseg token 
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    unsigned char pl; 
    unsigned char part_id; 
    unsigned char path_len; 
    unsigned char path[256]; 
} audit_token_dseg_t; 
 
 pl refers to the privilege level of dseg 
 part_id refers to the home partition ID of dseg 
 path_len refers to the length of the dseg path 
 path refers to the dseg path 
typedef struct { 
    unsigned char ec_id; 
    unsigned int ec_value; 
} audit_token_eventcount_t; 
 
Structure type for eventcount token 
 ec_id refers to the eventcount ID 
 ec_value refers to the value of the eventcount 
typedef struct { 
unsigned char int_num; 
} audit_token_interrupt_t; 
 
Structure type for interrupt token 
 int_num refers to the interrupt number 
 
typedef struct { 
unsigned char mac_addr[6]; 
} audit_token_mac_t; 
 
Structure type for MAC token 
 mac_addr refers to the MAC address 
 
typedef struct { 
    unsigned char mseg_id; 
    unsigned int size;  
    unsigned char pl;  
    unsigned char part_id; 
} audit_token_mseg_t; 
 
Structure type for mseg token 
 mseg_id refers to the mseg identifier 
 size refers to the size of the mseg 
 pl refers to the privilege level of mseg 
 part_id refers to the home partition ID of mseg 
 
typedef struct { 
    unsigned char part_id; 
} audit_token_partition_t; 
 
Structure type for partition token 
 part_id refers to the partition ID 
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typedef struct { 
unsigned char part_id; 
unsigned char proc_id; 
} audit_token_process_t; 
 
Structure type for process token 
 part_id refers to partition ID of the process 
 proc_id refers to the process ID of the process 
 
typedef struct { 
    unsigned int ret_val; 
} audit_token_return_t; 
 
Structure type for return token 
 ret_val refers to the return value of a function 
call 
typedef struct { 
    unsigned char seq_id; 
    unsigned int seq_value; 
} audit_token_sequencer_t; 
 
Structure type for sequencer token 
 seq_id refers to the sequencer ID 
 seq_value refers to the value of the sequencer 
typedef struct { 
    unsigned char sig_channel; 
} audit_token_signal_t; 
 
Structure type for signal token 
 sig_channel refers to the signal channel 
 
typedef struct { 
    unsigned char part_id; 
    unsigned int proc_id; 
    unsigned char pl;  
} audit_token_subject_t; 
 
Structure type for subject token 
 part_id refers to the partition ID of the subject 
 proc_id refers to the process ID of the subject 
 pl refers to the privilege level of the subject 
 
typedef struct { 
    unsigned char txt_len; 
    unsigned char txt[256]; 
} audit_token_text_t; 
 
Structure type for subject token 
 txt_len refers to the length of the text string 
 txt refers to the text string 
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Table 13 describes a list of interfaces that are provided to allow LPSK modules to 
communicate with the audit subsystem. 
Table 13.   Interfaces Provided to LPSK Modules 
Interfaces Description 
unsigned int audit_enabled(void)  Returns TRUE if audit is enabled and 
returns FALSE if not.  
 
unsigned int audit_write_INI_cv( 
     audit_token_cv_t *cv_tokptr); 
Generate an audit record with 
identifying information about the 
configuration vector. The input 
parameter is a pointer to a configuration 
vector token type that contains 
information identifying the 
configuration vector. 
 
unsigned int audit_write_INI_bind( 
     audit_token_text_t *text_tokptr); 
 
Generate an audit record for the 
unsuccessful binding of security 
attributes to individual partitions, 
subjects, and non-subject exported 
resources. The input parameter is a 
pointer to a text token type that 
describes the event. 
 
unsigned int audit_write_INI_assign( 
     audit_token_text_t *text_tokptr); 
 
For some fields in the configuration 
vector, a declared value is optional. 
When an optional value is not given, the 
LPSK platform is required to use a 
default value for the duration of an 
operational mode.  Generate an audit 
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record when such assignments of default 
values during initialization occurred. 
The input parameter is a pointer to a text 
token type that describes the event. 
 
unsigned int audit_write_INI_invalid( 
     audit_token_text_t *text_tokptr); 
 
Generate an audit record for the 
detection during LPSK initialization of 
an invalid value or set of values in a 
binary configuration vector. The input 
parameter is a pointer to a text token 
type that describes the event. 
 
unsigned int audit_write_INI_complete(void); 
 
Generate an audit record for the 
successful completion of LPSK 
initialization 
 
unsigned int audit_write_SYS_auditstart( 
     unsigned short evt_mod); 
 
Generate an audit record for the 
successful start-up and shutdown of the 
LPSK audit mechanism by the LPSK 
Initializer. An input argument of 0 
indicates a start-up, and 1 indicates a 
shutdown 
 
unsigned int audit_write_SYS_actiontest( 
     audit_token_text_t *text_tokptr); 
 
Generate an audit record for the actions 
taken because of a failure of an LPSK 
self-test.  The input parameter is a 
pointer to the text token type that 
describes the actions taken. 
 
unsigned int audit_write_SYS_configchange( Generate an audit record for all requests 
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     audit_token_subject_t *sub_tokptr 
     audit_token_argument_t *arg_tok, 
     audit_token_return_t *return_tok); 
 
for a configuration change. The input 
parameters are pointers to a subject 
token type and an argument token type 
that describes the argument provided for 
the configuration change and a return 





Generate an audit record for the success 
of each startup of the LPSK. 
 
unsigned int audit_write_SYS_failtest( 
     audit_token_text_t *text_tokptr); 
 
Generate an audit record for the failure 
of an LPSK self test. The input 
parameter is a pointer to the text token 
type that describes the event. 
 
 
unsigned int audit_write_SYS_loss( 
     audit_token_text_t *text_tokptr); 
 
Generate an audit record for any 
detected loss of secure state. The input 
parameter is a pointer to the text token 
type that describes the event. 
 
unsigned int audit_write_SYS_recover( 
     audit_token_text_t *text_tokptr); 
 
Generate an audit record for an action 
taken to attempt to recover the LPSK to 
a secure state. The input parameter is a 
pointer to the text token type that 
describes the action taken. 
 
unsigned int audit_write_SYS_failsecure( 
     audit_token_text_t *text_tokptr); 
Generate an audit record for the inability 
of the LPSK to return to a secure state 
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 after failure of a security function. The 
input parameter is a pointer to the text 
token type that describes the event. 
 
unsigned int audit_write_SYS_time( 
     audit_token_subject_t *sub_tokptr, 
     audit_token_argument_t *arg_tokptr, 
     audit_token_return_t *return_tokptr); 
 
Generate an audit record for changes to 
the LPSK time source. The input 
parameters are pointers to a subject 
token type, an argument token type that 
describes the argument provided for the 
change to the time source, and a return 
token type that indicates the return 
value. 
 
unsigned int audit_write_SYS_sak( 
     audit_token_partition_t *part_tokptr); 
 
Generate an audit record for the 
detection of a SAK invocation. The 
input parameter is a pointer to the 
partition token type that describes the 
partition. 
 
unsigned int audit_write_SYS_shut( 
     unsigned short evt_mod); 
 
Generate an audit record for the 
shutdown, powerdown or halt of a 
platform. An input argument of 0 
indicates a shutdown, 1 indicates a 
powerdown and 2 indicates a halt. 
 
unsigned int audit_write_DEV_read( 
     audit_token_subject_t *sub_tokptr, 
     audit_token_device_t *device_tok, 
     audit_token_return_t *return_tok); 
 
Generate an audit record when a read 
operation of a particular device is 
requested. The input parameters are 
pointers to a subject token type, a device 




unsigned int audit_write_DEV_write( 
     audit_token_subject_t *sub_tokptr, 
     audit_token_device_t *device_tok, 
     audit_token_return_t *return_tok); 
 
Generate an audit record when a write 
operation of a particular device is 
requested. The input parameters are 
pointers to a subject token type, a device 
token type and a return token type. 
 
unsigned int audit_writeDEV_metaread( 
     audit_token_subject_t *sub_tokptr, 
     audit_token_device_t *device_tok, 
     audit_token_arg_t *arg_tok,  
     audit_token_return_t *return_tok); 
 
Generate an audit record when a read 
meta-data operation for a particular 
device is requested. The input 
parameters are pointers to a subject 
token type, a device token type, an 
argument token type and a return token 
type. 
 
unsigned int audit_write_DEV_metawrite( 
     audit_token_subject_t *sub_tokptr, 
     audit_token_device_t *device_tok, 
     audit_token_arg_t *arg_tok,  
     audit_token_return_t *return_tok); 
 
Generate an audit record when a write 
meta-data operation for a particular 
device is requested. The input 
parameters are pointers to a subject 
token type, a device token type, an 
argument token type and a return token 
type. 
 
unsigned int audit_write_DEV_mac( 
     audit_token_partition_t *part_tokptr, 
     audit_token_mac_t *mac_tok); 
 
Generate an audit record when duplicate 
MAC addresses are detected. The input 
parameters are pointers to a partition 
token type and a mac token type that 
contains the MAC address. 
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unsigned int audit_write_DEV_subread( 
     audit_token_subject_t *sub_tokptr, 
     audit_token_device_t *device_tok, 
     audit_token_return_t *return_tok); 
 
Generate an audit record when a device 
read is requested by a particular subject. 
The input parameters are pointers to a 
subject token type, a device token type 
and a return token type. 
 
unsigned int audit_write_DEV_subwrite( 
     audit_token_subject_t *sub_tokptr, 
     audit_token_device_t device_tok, 
     audit_token_return_t return_tok); 
 
Generate an audit record when a device 
write is requested by a particular subject. 
The input parameters are pointers to a 
subject token type, a device token type 
and a return token type. 
 
unsigned int audit_writeDEV_subconf( 
     audit_token_subject_t *sub_tokptr, 
     audit_token_device_t device_tok, 
     audit_token_arg_t arg_tok,  
     audit_token_return_t return_tok); 
 
Generate an audit record when a device 
configuration is requested by a particular 
subject. The input parameters are 
pointers to a subject token type, a device 
token type, an argument token type and 
a return token type. 
 
unsigned int audit_write_PRO_start( 
     audit_token_process_t *proc_tokptr); 
 
Generate an audit record for the success 
or failure of starting a process.  The 
input parameter is a pointer to a process 
token type. 
 
unsigned int audit_write_PRO_terminate( 
audit_token_process_t *proc_tokptr); 
 
Generate an audit record for the 
termination of a process.  The input 
parameter is a pointer to a process token 
type. 
 
unsigned int audit_write_PRO_sigsent( Generate an audit record when a signal 
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     audit_token_subject_t *subject_tok, 
     audit_token_signal_t *signal_tok, 
     audit_token_subject_t *subject_tok, 
     audit_token_return_t *return_tok); 
 
is sent by a particular subject. The input 
parameters are pointers to a sender 
subject token type, a signal token type, a 
recipient subject token type and a return 
token type. 
 
unsigned int audit_write_PRO_sigrecv( 
     audit_token_subject_t *subject_tok, 
     audit_token_signal_t *signal_tok, 
     audit_token_subject_t *subject_tok, 
     audit_token_return_t *return_tok); 
 
Generate an audit record when a signal 
is received by a particular subject. The 
input parameters are pointers to a 
recipient subject token type, a signal 
token type, a sender subject token type 
and a return token type. 
 
unsigned int audit_write_PRO_interrupt( 
     audit_token_subject_t *subject_tok, 
     audit_token_interrupt_t *interrupt_tok, 
     audit_token_return_t *return_tok); 
 
Generate an audit record when a 
software interrupt is invoked by a 
particular subject. The input parameters 
are pointers to a subject token type, an 
interrupt token type, and a return token 
type. 
 
unsigned int audit_write_MEM_dsegexceed( 
     audit_token_subject_t *subject_tok, 
     audit_token_dseg_t *dseg_tok); 
 
Generate an audit record when an 
attempt to swapin a dseg exceeded 
memory quota. The input parameters are 
pointers to a subject token type, and a 
dseg token type. 
  
 
unsigned int audit_write_MEM_msegexceed( 
     audit_token_subject_t *subject_tok, 
     audit_token_mseg_t *mseg_tok); 
Generate an audit record when an 
attempt to create a mseg exceeds the 
memory quota. The input parameters are 
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 pointers to a subject token type, and a 
mseg token type. 
 
unsigned int audit_write_MEM_swapin( 
     audit_token_subject_t *subject_tok, 
     audit_token_dseg_t *dseg_tok, 
     audit_token_return_t *return_tok); 
 
Generate an audit record when a 
particular segment is swapped in. The 
input parameters are pointers to a 
subject token type, a dseg token type 
and a return token type. 
 
unsigned int audit_write_MEM_flush( 
     audit_token_subject_t *subject_tok, 
     audit_token_dseg_t *dseg_tok, 
     audit_token_return_t *return_tok); 
 
Generate an audit record when a 
particular segment is flushed. The input 
parameters are pointers to a subject 
token type, a dseg token type and a 
return token type. 
 
unsigned int audit_write_MEM_swapout( 
     audit_token_subject_t *subject_tok, 
     audit_token_dseg_t *dseg_tok, 
     audit_token_return_t *return_tok); 
 
Generate an audit record when a 
particular segment is swapped out. The 
input parameters are pointers to a 
subject token type, a dseg token type 
and a return token type. 
 
unsigned int audit_write_MEM_msegcreate( 
     audit_token_subject_t *subject_tok, 
     audit_token_mseg_t *mseg_tok, 
     audit_token_return_t *return_tok); 
 
Generate an audit record when a mseg is 
created. The input parameters are 
pointers to a subject token type, a mseg 
token type and a return token type. 
unsigned int audit_write_SYN_procawait( 
     audit_token_subject_t *subject_tok, 
     audit_token_eventcount_t *evtcnt_tok, 
     audit_token_return_t *return_tok); 
Generate an audit record when a process 
awakes from an await on an eventcount. 
The input parameters are pointers to a 
subject token type, an eventcount token 
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 type and a return token type. 
 
unsigned int audit_write_SYN_ecadvance( 
     audit_token_subject_t *subject_tok, 
     audit_token_eventcount_t *evtcnt_tok, 
     audit_token_return_t *return_tok); 
 
Generate an audit record when an 
advance of an eventcount is requested. 
The input parameters are pointers to a 
subject token type, an eventcount token 
type and a return token type. 
 
unsigned int audit_write_SYN_ecread( 
     audit_token_subject_t *subject_tok, 
     audit_token_eventcount_t *evtcnt_tok, 
     audit_token_return_t *return_tok); 
 
Generate an audit record when a read of 
an eventcount is requested. The input 
parameters are pointers to a subject 
token type, an eventcount token type and 
a return token type. 
 
unsigned int audit_write_SYN_ecawake( 
     audit_token_subject_t *subject_tok, 
     audit_token_eventcount_t *evtcnt_tok, 
     audit_token_return_t *return_tok); 
 
Generate an audit record when an awake 
of an eventcount is requested. The input 
parameters are pointers to a subject 
token type, an eventcount token type and 
a return token type. 
 
unsigned int audit_write_SYN_ecwakeup( 
     audit_token_subject_t *subject_tok, 
     audit_token_eventcount_t *evtcnt_tok, 
     audit_token_return_t *return_tok); 
 
Generate an audit record when a wakeup 
on an eventcount is requested. The input 
parameters are pointers to a subject 
token type, an eventcount token type and 
a return token type. 
 
unsigned int audit_write_SYN_seqticket( 
     audit_token_subject_t *subject_tok, 
     audit_token_sequencer_t *seq_tok, 
     audit_token_return_t *return_tok); 
Generate an audit record when the ticket 
of a sequencer is requested by a 
particular subject. The input parameters 
are pointers to a subject token type, a 
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 sequencer token type and a return token 
type. 
 
unsigned int audit_write_SYN_subecread( 
     audit_token_subject_t *subject_tok, 
     audit_token_eventcount_t *evtcnt_tok, 
     audit_token_return_t *return_tok); 
 
Generate an audit record when a read of 
an eventcount is requested by a 
particular subject. The input parameters 
are pointers to a subject token type, an 
eventcount token type and a return token 
type. 
 
unsigned int audit_write_SYN_subecadvance( 
     audit_token_subject_t *subject_tok, 
     audit_token_eventcount_t *evtcnt_tok, 
     audit_token_return_t *return_tok); 
 
Generate an audit record when an 
advance of an eventcount is requested 
by a particular subject. The input 
parameters are pointers to a subject 
token type, an eventcount token type and 
a return token type. 
 
unsigned int audit_write_SYN_subecawait( 
     audit_token_subject_t *subject_tok, 
     audit_token_eventcount_t *evtcnt_tok, 
     audit_token_return_t *return_tok); 
 
Generate an audit record when an await 
on an eventcount is requested by a 
particular subject. The input parameters 
are pointers to a subject token type, an 
eventcount token type and a return token 
type. 
 
unsigned int audit_write_SYN_subseqticket( 
     audit_token_subject_t *subject_tok, 
     audit_token_sequencer_t *seq_tok, 
     audit_token_return_t *return_tok); 
 
Generate an audit record when the ticket 
of a sequencer is requested by a 
particular subject. The input parameters 
are pointers to a subject token type, a 
sequencer token type and a return token 
type. 
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A selection process was performed on the 46 auditable events to identify those 
that are potentially implementable in the current LPSK prototype and those events that 
are likely to occur during the execution of each process. Ten high priority interfaces were 












2. Exported LPSK Audit Interfaces 
Table 14 describes the  interfaces that are provided to allow a non-kernel audit 
retrieval application to communicate with the audit subsystem. 
Table 14.   Exported LPSK Audit Interfaces 
Interfaces Description 
unsigned int audit_read_next( 
     unsigned short max_len,  
     unsigned char *buffer, 
     unsigned short *num_requested,  
     unsigned short *num_read); 
Reads the oldest records from the audit 
buffer and places them into the output 
parameter buffer (The number of records 
requested is indicated via num_requested, 
and the size of the buffer is indicated in 
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max_len). Returns the number of records 
placed inside buffer through num_read. If 
there are fewer than num_requested records 
in the Audit Buffer, then the available 
records are put into the buffer, and no error 
is returned. If there are num_requested 
records, but they would not all fit into 
buffer, then those that will fit will be put 
into buffer, and no error is returned. If there 
are no audit records to be obtained, then 
num_read is set to to indicate that the 
buffer is empty. 
 
unsigned int audit_read_buffer_size( 
     unsigned int *buffer_size); 
Reads the audit buffer size and places it 
into the output parameter buffer_size. 
 
unsigned int audit_read_num_rec( 
     unsigned int *num_rec); 
Returns the number of records in the audit 
buffer and places it into the output 
parameter num_rec. 
 
Unsigned int audit_read_num_generated( 
unsigned int *num_generated) 
Returns the total number of records 
generated during the current operational 
mode in the output parameter 
num_generated. This number will wrap-
around to zero if more than 232 audit 
records are generated in an operational 
mode. 
 
unsigned int audit_read_num_overwritten( 
     unsigned int *num_overwritten); 
Reads the number of records overwritten 
and places it into the output parameter 
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num_overwritten. This represents the 
number of audit records that have been 
overwritten during the current operational 
mode because the buffer was full when a 
new record was generated. This number 
will wrap-around to zero if more than 232 




E. AUDIT BUFFER IMPLEMENTATION 
Audit records collected by the Audit Collector are first stored in an Audit Buffer, 
then they may be read by an authorized Audit Retrieval subject, which may save them on 
a secondary storage device. Because the size of the Audit Buffer is limited, records that 
have been read by the Audit Retrieval subject need to be deleted from the Audit Buffer to 
free up space for new records.  
Because records will be deleted as they are read, and new records will be added as 
space allows, it was determined that the Audit Buffer should be implemented using the 
abstract data type of a circular buffer. A circular buffer is a First-In-First-Out (FIFO) 
queue which means that the oldest record will be read first. The size of the Audit Buffer 
is specified in the configuration vector and a memory segment of that size is allocated to 
the Audit Buffer during the audit subsystem initialization phase. 
The circular buffer is implemented as an array of bytes inside the memory 
segment. Two indices are used to keep track of where the oldest record starts, and where 
the newest record ends:  first and last. These two variables mark the start and end of the 
queue respectively. A new audit record is added to the end of the queue, at the location 
referenced by the last index, which is then incremented to point to the end of the new 
record. When the last index reaches the end of the allocated memory segment, it will 
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“wrap around” and move to the beginning of the memory segment. An audit record is 
read from the start of the queue marked by the first index, which is then modified to point 
to the next record in the queue.   
When the audit retrieval application attempts to read an empty buffer, i.e. when 
first and last indices point to the same location, the audit subsystem will return zero bytes 
of data read to the calling application to indicate that audit buffer is empty. When the 
LPSK modules attempt to write to a full buffer, i.e. when incrementing last index will 
cause it to point to the same location as first index, the audit subsystem will either 
overwrite the oldest record, halt or shutdown. The behavior can be configured in the 
configuration vector. 
 When the audit subsystem overwrites an audit record, it will first increment the 
first index by the amount equal to the length of the oldest record and thus makes it point 
to the second oldest record. In this way, it effectively discards the oldest record and 
allows a new record to overwrite the space used by the oldest record. It is possible that 
the newest record is larger than the oldest record, which may cause more than one record 
to be overwritten.   
Two more variables, record_num and overwritten_num, are used to keep track of 
the number of records in the buffer and the number of records that have been overwritten 
respectively. They are updated whenever records are read, written or overwritten. The 
audit retrieval application can query the audit subsystem for the values of these variables 
through kernel APIs. Each variable is stored using a 32-bit unsigned integer, which will 
roll over to zero when the maximum value is reached. It is the responsibility of the audit 
retrieval application to take the necessary actions to deal with rollover. 
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V. TESTING  
This chapter consists of two parts: The first part describes the developmental 
testing of the individual audit subsystem interfaces. The second part describes the 
acceptance testing of the entire audit subsystem to meet the requirements stipulated in 
Chapter III. 
A. DEVELOPMENTAL TESTING 
The purpose of the developmental testing is to ensure that each interface of the 
LPSK audit subsystem behaves in the way intended by design.  
1. Testing of Interfaces to Kernel Modules 
Tables 15 through 25 show the test suite for the APIs provided by the audit 
subsystem to other LPSK modules to allow them to write audit records to the Audit 
Buffer. Eleven of the internal APIs are implemented for this research. The functions were 
tested independently of each other after the initialization of the audit subsystem. Test 
code was inserted into the LPSK modules to invoke the functions using different input 
arguments and sometimes under different conditions. Debugging messages were 
generated to provide a mean of verifying the outcome.   
The Test ID column in each of the tables provides a unique identifier for each test 
case. The test cases can be classified into two different types: functional and exception. A 
functional test type describes a normal use case where the action is designed to verify the 
successful invocation of a function call to accomplish certain tasks. An exception test 
type describes a test case were the action is designed to cause errors within specific 
components of the audit subsystem. The purpose of these tests is to verify that the audit 
subsystem is able to handle exceptions and exhibits expected behavior under such 
circumstances.  The Action column gives a summary of the actions performed during the 
test, and preconditions for the test cases are described where applicable. The Expected 
Result column describes the expected behavior of the component for each test case. 
 
 70




Test Type Action Expected Result Pass /  
Fail 
F1-1 Functional Call function when 
audit is not enabled 
FALSE is returned Pass 
F1-2 Exception Call function when 
audit is enabled 
TRUE is returned Pass 
 




Test Type Action Expected Result Pass /  
Fail 
F2-1 Functional Call function when audit 
is enabled. Provide valid 
input arguments. 
AUD_NO_ERR is returned. 
Record is successfully written to 
the Audit Buffer.  
Pass 
F2-2 Exception Call function when audit 
is disabled 
AUD_ERR_DISABLED error 
code is returned 
Pass 
F2-3 Exception Provide null pointer as 
arguments 
AUD_ERR_INVALID_PARAM 
error code is returned 
Pass 
F2-4 Exception Set the length of 
descriptive text to 0 
AUD_ERR_INVALID_PARAM 










Test Type Action Expected Result Pass /  
Fail 
F3-1 Functional Call function when audit 
is enabled. 
AUD_NO_ERR is returned. Record 
is successfully written to the Audit 
Buffer. 
Pass 
F3-2 Exception Call function when audit 
is disabled. 








Test Type Action Expected Result Pass /  
Fail 
F4-1 Functional Call function when audit is 
enabled. Event modifier is 
set to 
AUD_MOD_START 
AUD_NO_ERR is returned. Record 
is successfully written to the Audit 
Buffer. 
Pass 
F4-2 Functional Call function when audit is 




AUD_NO_ERR is returned. Record 
is successfully written to the Audit 
Buffer. 
Pass 
F4-3 Exception Call function when audit is 
enabled. Provide invalid 
event modifier. 
AUD_ERR_INVALID_PARAM 
error code is returned 
Pass 
F4-4 Exception Call function when audit is 
disabled. 








Test Type Action Expected Result Pass /  
Fail 
F5-1 Functional Call function when audit 
is enabled. 
AUD_NO_ERR is returned. 
Record is successfully written to 
the Audit Buffer. 
Pass 
F5-2 Exception Call function when audit 
is disabled. 
AUD_ERR_DISABLED error 
code is returned 
Pass 
 




Test Type Action Expected Result Pass /  
Fail 
F6-1 Functional Call function when audit 
is enabled. Provide valid 
input arguments. 
AUD_NO_ERR is returned. 
Record is successfully written to 
the Audit Buffer. 
Pass 
F6-2 Exception Call function when audit 
is disabled. 
AUD_ERR_DISABLED error 
code is returned 
Pass 
F6-3 Exception Provide null pointer as 
arguments 
AUD_ERR_INVALID_PARAM 
error code is returned 
Pass 
F6-4 Exception Provide an out of bound  
partition ID as argument 
AUD_ERR_INVALID_PARAM 









Test Type Action Expected Result Pass /  
Fail 
F7-1 Functional Call function when audit 
is enabled. Provide valid 
input arguments. 
AUD_NO_ERR is returned. 
Record is successfully written to 
the Audit Buffer. 
Pass 
F7-2 Exception Call function when audit 
is disabled. 
AUD_ERR_DISABLED error 
code is returned 
Pass 
F7-3 Exception Provide null pointer as 
arguments 
AUD_ERR_INVALID_PARAM 
error code is returned 
Pass 
F7-4 Exception Set dseg path length 
input argument to 0 
AUD_ERR_INVALID_PARAM 
error code is returned 
Pass 




Test Type Action Expected Result Pass /  
Fail 
F8-1 Functional Call function when audit 
is enabled. Provide valid 
input arguments. 
AUD_NO_ERR is returned. 
Record is successfully written to 
the Audit Buffer. 
Pass 
F8-2 Exception Call function when audit 
is disabled. 
AUD_ERR_DISABLED error 
code is returned 
Pass 
F8-3 Exception Provide null pointer as 
arguments 
AUD_ERR_INVALID_PARAM 
error code is returned 
Pass 
F8-4 Exception Provide an out of bound 
mseg ID as argument 
AUD_ERR_INVALID_PARAM 
error code is returned 
Pass 
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Test Type Action Expected Result Pass /  
Fail 
F9-1 Functional Call function when audit 
is enabled. Provide valid 
input arguments. 
AUD_NO_ERR is returned. 
Record is successfully written to 
the Audit Buffer. 
Pass 
F9-2 Exception Call function when audit 
is disabled. 
AUD_ERR_DISABLED error 
code is returned 
Pass 
F9-3 Exception Provide null pointer as 
arguments 
AUD_ERR_INVALID_PARAM 
error code is returned 
Pass 
F9-4 Exception Provide an out of bound 
eventcount ID as 
argument 
AUD_ERR_INVALID_PARAM 








Test Type Action Expected Result Pass /  
Fail 
F10-1 Functional Call function when 
audit is enabled. 
Provide valid input 
arguments. 
AUD_NO_ERR is returned. 
Record is successfully written to 
the Audit Buffer. 
Pass 
F10-2 Exception Call function when 
audit is disabled. 
AUD_ERR_DISABLED error 
code is returned 
Pass 
F10-3 Exception Provide null pointer as 
arguments 
AUD_ERR_INVALID_PARAM 
error code is returned 
Pass 
F10-4 Exception Provide an out of bound 
eventcount ID as 
argument 
AUD_ERR_INVALID_PARAM 








Test Type Action Expected Result Pass /  
Fail 
F11-1 Functional Call function when 
audit is enabled. 
Provide valid input 
arguments. 
AUD_NO_ERR is returned. 
Record is successfully written to 
the Audit Buffer. 
Pass 
F11-2 Exception Call function when 
audit is disabled. 
AUD_ERR_DISABLED error 
code is returned 
Pass 
F11-3 Exception Provide null pointer as 
arguments 
AUD_ERR_INVALID_PARAM 
error code is returned 
Pass 
F11-4 Exception Provide an out of bound 
sequencer ID as 
argument 
AUD_ERR_INVALID_PARAM 
error code is returned 
Pass 
 
2. Testing of Exported Interfaces to Audit Retrieval 
Tables 26 through 30 describe the testing of the functions exported by the audit 
subsystem to authorized subjects. A test application residing in PL3 was created to 
facilitate the testing. The API calls were invoked from the test application and the results 










Test Type Action Expected Result Pass /  
Fail 
F12-1 Functional Call function when 
audit is enabled. 
Request to read 1 
record from the Audit 
Buffer. 
AUD_NO_ERR is returned. 
Record is successfully read from 
the Audit Buffer. Number of 
records read is correctly returned 
via the output parameter. 
Pass 
F12-2 Functional Call function when 
audit is enabled. 
Request to read 
multiple records from 
the Audit Buffer. 
AUD_NO_ERR is returned. 
Records are successfully read 
from the Audit Buffer. Number 
of records read is correctly 
returned via the output 
parameter. 
Pass 
F12-3 Exception Call function when 
audit is disabled. 
AUD_ERR_DISABLED error 
code is returned 
Pass 
F12-4 Exception Provide null pointer as 
argument 
AUD_ERR_INVALID_PARAM 
error code is returned 
Pass 
F12-5 Exception Provide a buffer size 
that is smaller than the 
record length.  
AUD_ERR_SIZE_EXCEED 
error code is returned 
Pass 
F12-6 Exception Request to read 1 
record when the Audit 
Buffer is empty.   
A value of 0 is returned for 
number of records read. 
AUD_ERR_BUF_EMPTY error 
code is also returned. 
Pass 
F12-7 Functional Request to read more All the records in the Audit Pass 
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records than is in the 
Audit Buffer. (E.g. 
Request to read 3 
records when there is 
only 2 record in the 
Audit Buffer)  
Buffer are read. Number of 
records read is correctly returned 
via the output parameter.  
F12-8 Functional Request to read more 
than 1 record but the 
size of the buffer is not 
enough to receive all 
the records requested. 
Records that will fit into the 
buffer are read. Number of 
records read is correctly returned 
via the output parameter. 
 
 








Functional Call function when 
audit is enabled. Provide 
valid argument to store 
size of Audit Buffer. 
AUD_NO_ERR is returned. Size 
of Audit Buffer is correctly 





Exception Call function when 
audit is disabled. 
AUD_ERR_DISABLED error 




Exception Provide null pointer as 
argument 
AUD_ERR_INVALID_PARAM 












Test Type Action Expected Result Pass /  
Fail 
F14-1 Functional Call function when 
audit is enabled. 
Provide valid argument 
to store the number of 
records in the Audit 
Buffer. 
AUD_NO_ERR is returned. 
Number of records in the Audit 
Buffer is correctly returned via 
the output parameter. 
Pass 
F14-2 Exception Call function when 
audit is disabled. 
AUD_ERR_DISABLED error 
code is returned 
Pass 
F14-3 Exception Provide null pointer as 
argument 
AUD_ERR_INVALID_PARAM 








Test Type Action Expected Result Pass /  
Fail 
F15-1 Functional Call function when 
audit is enabled. 
Provide valid argument 
to store total number of 
records generated. 
AUD_NO_ERR is returned. 
Total number of records 
generated is correctly returned 
via the output parameter. 
Pass 
F15-2 Exception Call function when 
audit is disabled. 
AUD_ERR_DISABLED error 
code is returned 
Pass 
F15-3 Exception Provide null pointer as 
argument 
AUD_ERR_INVALID_PARAM 








Test Type Action Expected Result Pass /  
Fail 
F16-1 Functional Call function when 
audit is enabled. 
Provide valid argument 
to store total number of 
records already 
overwritten. 
AUD_NO_ERR is returned. 
Total number of records 
overwritten is correctly returned 
via the output parameter. 
Pass 
F16-2 Exception Call function when 
audit is disabled. 
AUD_ERR_DISABLED error 
code is returned 
Pass 
F16-3 Exception Provide null pointer as 
argument 
AUD_ERR_INVALID_PARAM 
error code is returned 
Pass 
 
3. Testing of Audit Buffer 
Table 31 describes additional testing performed on the Audit Buffer. The correct 
implementation of the Audit Buffer provides assurance that audit records will not be 
accidentally modified or deleted during read or write operations. 
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Table 31.   Test for Audit Buffer 
Test 
ID 
Test Type Action Expected Result Pass /  
Fail 
AB-1 Functional Add and retrieve a 
record to/from the 
Audit Buffer one at a 
time. Iterate this 
process until the read / 
write process “wraps 
around” the Audit 
Buffer a few times.   
Audit records successfully 
written and read from the Audit 
buffer. 
Pass 
AB-2 Exception Add an audit record to 
the Audit Buffer when 
it is full, such that the 
newest record is of a 
different type than the 
record to be 
overwritten. (Audit 
Buffer is configured to 
overwrite old records.)  
The oldest audit record is 
overwritten. The number of 
records overwritten and the 
number of records in the Audit 
Buffer is updated. Retrieve all 
the audit records and verify that 
that last record returned is the 




The developmental testing proved to be very useful as a number of bugs were 
detected. Bugs related to the Audit Buffer were especially difficult to detect because they 
occur intermittently and are difficult to replicate. To make matters worse, the debugging 
process is very time consuming as every time a change is made, the files must be 
transferred from the development virtual machine to the test virtual machine and the test 
virtual machine must then be rebooted. 
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Nevertheless, Developmental testing has helped to provide a systematic way to 
isolate problems. All the bugs that were found were successfully corrected. The test was 
re-run successfully and no additional problem was found.  
B. ACCEPTANCE TESTING 
The purpose of the acceptance testing is to ensure the proper functioning of the 
audit subsystem to support the audit requirements of LPSK. The LPSK kernel source 
code was modified to generate various audit events. It was compiled together with the 
audit subsystem modules. The configuration vector was configured to create eventcounts, 
sequencers,  msegs and dsegs for the purpose of  audit record generation testing. After 
successful initialization, the LPSK modules start to invoke function calls to the audit 
subsystems to record the audit events.  
A test application was also created to read the audit records from the Audit 
Buffer. The test application provides the user with a menu interface to select different 
types of requests to the audit subsystem. A user can use the menu to retrieve audit records 
from the Audit Buffer. Because the LPSK does not support a secondary storage device 
driver in the current prototype implementation, the test application creates another buffer 
to simulate a secondary storage device. Retrieved audit records are stored in this buffer. 
The test application can also read and display the audit records on the console. This 
allows manual inspection of the audit records to verify that audit event information is 
correctly captured in the record.  
Table 32 describes the acceptance tests performed when audit is enabled. The 







Table 32.   Acceptance Tests when Audit is Enabled 
Test 
ID 
Action Expected Result Pass /  
Fail 
A-1 Boot up LPSK. Start the audit 
test application. Request for 
the number of audit records 
in the Audit Buffer. 
Audit subsystem correctly returns the 
number of records generated 
Pass 
A-2 After doing A-1, request to 
read an audit record from the 
Audit Buffer, followed by a 
request for the number of 
audit records. Repeat until 
Audit Buffer is empty. 
Audit records are successfully  read 
from the Audit Buffer. The number of 
audit records in the Audit Buffer is 
decremented by 1 after each retrieval. 
Pass 
A-3 Reboot the LPSK and go to 
the audit testing partition. 
Display and verify the audit 
records.  
Audit records for the following events 
are successfully returned. 
 start of LPSK audit subsystem 
 identifying information of the 
configuration vector 
 Swap in of a dseg defined in the 
configuration vector 
 Creation of a mseg defined in 
the configuration vector 
 Successful completion of LPSK 
initialization 




Correct timestamp is attached to each 
record. CRC32 checksum is verified for 
each record. 
A-4 Verify that the audit buffer is 
empty, then invoke a SAK 
and then return to the audit 
testing partition. Read the 
audit record. 
Audit record is returned for the 
detection of SAK 
Pass 
A-5 Verify that the audit buffer is 
empty, then request the ticket 
of a sequencer. (Test 
application has read and write 
permission to the sequencer) 
Audit record (for success) is returned 
for this event. 
Pass 
A-6 Verify that the audit buffer is 
empty, then request an await 
on an eventcount. (Test 
application has read and write 
permission to the eventcount) 
Audit record (for success) is returned 
for this event. 
Pass 
A-7 Verify that the audit buffer is 
empty, then advance the 
eventcount mentioned in A-6. 
(Test application has read and 
write permission to the 
eventcount) 
Audit record (for success) is returned 
when the process wake from an await on 
eventcount. 
Pass 
A-8 Verify that the audit buffer is 
empty, then request the ticket 
of a sequencer. (Test 
application does not have 




read and write permission to 
the sequencer) 
A-9 Verify that the audit buffer is 
empty, then request an await 
on an eventcount. (Test 
application does not have 
read and write permission to 
the eventcount) 
Audit record (for failure) is returned for 
this event. 
Pass 
A-10 Keep invoking the SAK to 
generate enough records to 
fill up the Audit Buffer. 
Audit records are generated. Old records 
are overwritten by new ones when the 
Audit Buffer is full. Number of audit 
records being overwritten is updated. 
Pass 
 
Table 33 describes the acceptance tests performed when audit is disabled. The 
purpose of this test is to ensure that LPSK continues to function properly when audit is 
disabled. 
Table 33.   Acceptance Tests when Audit is Disabled 
Test 
ID 
Action Expected Result Pass /  
Fail 
B-1 Boot up LPSK. Start the 
audit test application. 
Request for the number of 
audit records in the buffer. 
No audit record generated. Pass 
B-2 Request to read an audit 
record from the Audit Buffer. 
No audit record in the Audit Buffer. Pass 
B-3 Perform the tasks described 
in A-4 to A-10 in Table 31  
No audit record is returned. Pass 
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The acceptance tests were successful. No bugs were found during acceptance 
testing because the functional and exception tests appear to have identified all the bugs. 
Detailed test procedures and results are provided in the Appendix. 
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VI. CONCLUSION  
This study explored the best way to design and implement an audit subsystem for 
the LPSK. The first step was to gather the audit requirements that were sprinkled 
throughout the LPSK functional specifications and SKPP.  
From these requirements, a list of auditable events was created. It was determined 
that the information required to describe and record each event differs a lot. Some events 
require more attributes to describe them than others. This means that the size of the audit 
records could vary. Due to the fact that managing varying length records adds 
considerable amount of complexity to the implementation, the idea of allocating a 
maximum fixed size for each record was initially explored. In general, such an approach 
would result in inefficient use of limited memory space. A varying length token based 
record format was found to be the better solution for LPSK audit records. The highly 
structured nature of the tokens helps to relieve the difficulties in managing varying length 
records. 
Audit interfaces were defined to allow LPSK modules to send audit information 
to the audit subsystem and to allow an authorized application to retrieve audit records. 
The design is based on the assumption that only one authorized application retrieves 
records from the audit subsystem. No use case has been identified so far that would 
involve having multiple applications concurrently reading records from the Audit Buffer. 
After the audit interfaces were defined, an LPSK audit module was designed to 
manage the audit buffers and other audit metadata. Because of the specified nature of the 
audit subsystem, it was determined that the best abstract data structure for managing the 
records was a circular buffer, which would allow old records to be read from  one side of 
the buffer, and allow new records to be added to the other side of the buffer. 
A prototype audit subsystem was developed to test out the design. Development 
and testing was time consuming due to the fact that every run of the code involves 
transferring compiled binaries from the development virtual machine to the testing virtual 
machine. When the LPSK is initializing, there is not much feedback on the status of the 
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audit subsystem to know whether things are going right. A debugger, such as the 
VMware Vprobes [19], would have been helpful in troubleshooting the code at the kernel 
level. However, Vprobes requires developers to write scripts to collect the data they want 
to investigate. This creates a learning curve for developers who are unfamiliar with 
Vprobes scripts. Furthermore, the lack of a LPSK disk device driver means that currently 
it is not possible to write debug logs to a secondary storage device. The workaround was 
to strategically place function calls to print debug messages to the screen and pause the 
initialization to be able to see the messages before they are overwritten by other 
messages.  
Testing was conducted and problems were found due to incorrect implementation 
of the operations to read and write records to the audit buffer. The bugs were corrected 
and subsequent testing was completed successfully.  
A. RELATED WORK 
This section introduces related work on separation kernel audit subsystems. Green 
Hills’ INTEGRITY-178 Operating Systems [20] was the first separation kernel to be 
certified compliant with the SKPP. Its audit subsystem bears close resemblance to the one 
implemented in this study due to the fact that both INTEGRITY-178 and LPSK draw 
their audit requirements from the SKPP. 
The INTEGRITY-178’s audit event log is stored using a circular buffer in kernel 
memory. Once read, the audit record is removed from the circular buffer. The oldest 
record will be overwritten when the buffer fills up. This implementation is very similar to 
the LPSK’s implementation. The main difference is that the INTEGRITY-178 abstracts 
the circular buffer as an I/O device object. Accesses to the I/O devices are configured 
using static configuration files. No information regarding the format of the audit records 
for INTEGRITY-178 is available. 
The LynxSecure Embedded Hypervisor by LynuxWorks [21] and VxWorks by 
Wind Rivers Systems [22] are another two separation kernels undergoing certification to 
be compliant with SKPP. However, there was no information available about their 
implementations of the audit subsystems.   
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B. FUTURE WORK 
This section presents some recommendations for future work.  
1. Abstraction of Audit Subsystem as a Device 
Before finding the related work from Green Hills, it was already suggested that 
future work could look into the possibility of abstracting the audit interface like a device. 
The interface to the audit subsystem is very similar to a device interface, especially to an 
asynchronous read-only device like a keyboard. Both are using internal buffers to store 
data while exporting a set of kernel APIs to allow external applications to obtain the 
buffered information. The following are the potential benefits to this abstraction: 
 Access control to the audit API can be controlled in the same way the devices 
are controlled. 
 The audit metadata can be made available through the device CONTROL 
interface. 
 The number of kernel APIs is reduced, thus reducing kernel complexity. 
2. Audit Review 
This study has focused on the design of an audit subsystem to generate and collect 
audit events within the LPSK, and to provide an interface to allow authorized subjects to 
extract audit records from the kernel and store them on secondary storage for future 
review.  While a token-based audit record format is suitable within the LPSK, it may not 
be the ideal format for human review. The overall audit system would not be complete 
without providing an effective way for the administrator to review the audit records. A 
detailed study needs to be done to look at the best way to store, process and present the 
records to the administrator. This would also include exploring how records will be put 
into, and retrieved from, a secondary storage device.   
3. Performance Study 
In this study, it was decided that as long as audit is enabled, the LPSK modules 
will always send event information to the audit subsystem when a potential auditable 
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event has occurred. The audit subsystem checks the audit policy to decide whether the 
event should be recorded. While this approach is simple, a potential performance penalty 
may be incurred if a large portion of the events sent to the audit subsystem do not need to 
be audited. A study to assess the performance impact of such an approach is needed in 
order to determine the best way to perform the audit policy checking.   
4. Implementation of Unfinished Work 
Due to the fact that the LPSK prototype is currently incomplete, several of the 
audit subsystem features were not implemented in this work. The following is a list of 
work that needs to be done when the prototype is more fully developed: 
 Initialize the audit subsystem based on the configuration read from the 
configuration vector. This includes behavior of the circular buffer when it is 
full and advanced filtering rules for selective auditing of events based on 
attributes, which include subject identity, resource identity, event type, and 
success or failure of particular events. 
 Modify the header token to accept timestamps with finer granularity. The 
current LPSK prototype uses epoch time that can only measure to a 
granularity of one second, But it is expected that a future version of the LPSK 
will provide more granularity. 
 Implement auditing of all 46 auditable events identified in this study. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The LPSK provides a high assurance platform that could potentially be used to 
protect sensitive data in both public and private sectors. In order to ensure that 
accountability policies are being enforced correctly, and that no one is abusing their 
privileged access, there is a need for a mechanism to allow administrators to regularly 
review events. The audit subsystem prototype developed in this study has demonstrated a 
working mechanism to efficiently collect audit records and transfer them to an authorized 
application, which will then store or process these records for viewing by an 
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administrator.  Even though the audit prototype is not yet a complete implementation, it 
provides a good environment to study the various features of the audit design.  
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APPENDIX 
This appendix describes the test procedures for the test plan used in Chapter V. 
A. DEVELOPMENTAL TESTING 
Conditional test code was added to the LPSK modules to help to test the functions 
exported by the audit subsystem. The test code  invokes the audit functions using 
different input arguments and sometimes under different conditions, prints debug 
messages and displays values to the screen. To enable the test code, do the following: 
1. Find the line “wcc386 kernel_ini2.c $(INC) $(CC_OPTS)” in the Makefile 
and append the debug option “-DDEBUG_AUDIT_DEV” to the end of the 
line.  
2. Uncomment the line “#define AUDIT_ENABLED 1” and comment the line 
“#define AUDIT_ENABLED 0” in the lpsk_audit.h file to enable audit. 
3. Compile the LPSK code with the new Makefile.  
4. Copy the compiled binary to the test VM and power it on.  
After completing the above, the test code performs tests on various function calls 
and prints the results to the screen. Table 34 describes the expected results for the tests 
described in Chapter V when the audit is enabled. The function return code of 
AUD_NO_ERR is defined as 0 and AUD_ERR_INVALID_PARAM is defined as 1. 
Table 34.   Testing Results of Interfaces to Kernel Modules when Audit is Enabled 
Test ID Expected Results Summary 
F1-1 F1-1: Return code = 1 
F2-1 F2-1: Return code = 0 
F2-3 F2-3: Return code = 1 
F2-4 F2-4: Return code = 1 
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F3-1 F3-1: Return code = 0 
F4-1 F4-1: Return code = 0 
F4-2 F4-2: Return code = 0 
F4-3 F4-3: Return code = 1 
F5-1 F5-1: Return code = 0 
F6-1 F6-1: Return code = 0 
F6-3 F6-3: Return code = 1 
F6-4 F6-4: Return code = 1 
F7-1 F7-1: Return code = 0 
F7-3 F7-3: Return code = 1 
F7-4 F7-4: Return code = 1 
F8-1 F8-1: Return code = 0 
F8-3 F8-3: Return code = 1 
F8-4 F8-4: Return code = 1 
F9-1 F9-1: Return code = 0 
F9-3 F9-3: Return code = 1 
F9-4 F9-4: Return code = 1 
F10-1 F10-1: Return code = 0 
F10-3 F10-3: Return code = 1 
F10-4 F10-4: Return code = 1 
F11-1 F11-1: Return code = 0 
F11-3 F11-3: Return code = 1 
F11-4 F11-4: Return code = 1 
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Disable audit by doing the following: 
1. Commenting the line “#define AUDIT_ENABLED 1”  
2. Uncommenting the line “#define AUDIT_ENABLED 0” in the lpsk_audit.h 
file.  
3. Compile the LPSK code.  
4. Copy the binary to the test VM and power it on.  
Table 35 describes the expected results for the tests described in Chapter V when 
the audit is disabled. The function return code of AUD_ERR_DISABLED is defined as 
2. 
Table 35.   Testing Results of Interfaces to Kernel Modules when Audit is Disabled 
Test ID Expected Results Summary 
F1-2 F1-1: Return code = 0 
F2-2 F2-1: Return code = 2 
F3-2 F3-2: Return code = 2 
F4-4 F4-4: Return code = 2 
F5-2 F5-2: Return code = 2 
F6-2 F6-2: Return code = 2 
F7-2 F7-2: Return code = 2 
F8-2 F8-2: Return code = 2 
F8-3 F8-3: Return code = 2 
F8-4 F8-4: Return code = 2 
F9-2 F9-2: Return code = 2 
F10-2 F10-2: Return code = 2 
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F11-2 F11-2: Return code = 2 
 
To test the functions exported by the audit subsystem to authorized subjects, take 
the following steps: 
1. Set the size of the Audit Buffer to 1024 bytes via the AUDIT_BUFF_SIZE 
constant defined in lpsk_audit.h. Enable audit by setting the 
AUDIT_ENABLED constant in lpsk_audit.h to TRUE. Compile the code 
with “-DDEBUG_AUDIT_DEV” to generate audit events in the Audit Buffer 
for testing. 
2. Boot the Test Virtual Machine and login to Trusted Path Application 
3. Select “F – Change Partition Focus” option from the menu 
4. Select “1 – Audit Application” option from the menu 
5. From the main menu of the audit test application perform the steps shown in 
the “Menu Selection / Action” column of Table 36. The “Expected Results 
Summary” column shows the expected message displayed by the test 
application after each step has been performed. 
Table 36.   Testing Results of Interfaces to Audit Retrieval when Audit is Enabled 
Test ID Menu Selection / Action Expected Results Summary 
F13-1 Select “3 – Query size of audit buffer” Size of audit buffer = 1024 
Return code = 0 
(Remarks: return code 0 = 
AUD_NO_ERR) 
F14 -1 Select “4 – Query number of records in 
the Audit Buffer” 
Number of records in the buffer = 
19 
Return code = 0 
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F12-1 Select “1 – Retrieve records”. Enter “1” 
when asked to enter the number of 
records to retrieve. 
Number of records read = 1 
Return code = 0 
 
F12-2 Select “1 – Retrieve records”. Enter “3” 
when asked to enter the number of 
records to retrieve. 
Number of records read = 3 
Return code = 0 
 
F12-7 Retrieve 13 more records and leave 2 in 
the Audit Buffer. Select “1 – Retrieve 
records”. Enter “3” when asked to enter 
the number of records to retrieve. 
Number of records read = 2 
Return code = 0 
F12-8 Press “Alt-Esc” to generate a SAK, and 
then change the partition focus back to the 
audit application. Repeat the above 
mentioned action 5 times to generate 6 
SAK events in the Audit Buffer. Select “1 
– Retrieve records”. Enter “6” when 
asked to enter the number of records to 
retrieve. 
Number of records read = 5 
Return code = 0 
(Remarks: the size of the buffer 
provided by the test application is 
128 bytes, which is only enough 








Select “7 – Exception Testing” F12-4: Return code = 1 
F12-5: Return code = 5 
F13-3: Return code = 1 
F14-3: Return code = 1 
F15-3: Return code = 1 
F16-3: Return code = 1 
(Remarks: Return code 1 = 
AUD_ERR_INVALID_PARAM;
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Return code 5 = 
AUD_ERR_SIZE_EXCEED) 
F15-1 Select “6 – Query total number of records 
generated” 
Number of records generated = 
25 
Return code = 0 
F16-1 Select “5 – Query number of overwritten 
records” 
Number of records overwritten = 
0 
Return code = 0 
To perform the tests when audit is disabled, do the following: 
1. Disable audit by setting the AUDIT_ENABLED constant in lpsk_audit.h to 
FALSE.  
2. Recompile the code and boot up the Test Virtual Machine.  
3. Navigate to the audit test application main menu.  
4. Perform the steps shown in the “Menu Selection / Action” column of Table 
37. 
Table 37.   Testing Results of Interfaces to Audit Retrieval when Audit is Disabled 
Test ID Menu Selection / Action Expected Results Summary 
F12-3 Select “1 – Retrieve records”. Enter “1” 
when asked to enter the number of records 
to retrieve. 
Return code = 2 
(Remarks: return code 2 = 
AUD_ERR_DISABLED) 
F13-2 Select “3 – Query size of audit buffer” Return code = 2 
F14-2 Select “4 – Query number of records in the 
Audit Buffer” 
Return code = 2 
F15-2 Select “6 – Query total number of records Return code = 2 
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generated” 
F16-2 Select “5 – Query number of overwritten 
records” 
Return code = 2 
 
B. ACCEPTANCE TESTING 
The acceptance tests verified that audit records are generated for a set of 
predefined events. The configuration vector needs to be configured to ensure that mseg, 
dseg, sequencer and eventcount events are successfully generated during the acceptance 
tests. Perform the following steps: 
1. Insert the following lines in the LPSK initialization database file all_apps.pl0.  
a. EVENTCOUNT = {"Event  0",  3,  RW, RW, NA, RW, RW }; 
b. SEQUENCER = {"Seq  0",  3,  RW, RW, NA, RW, RW }; 
2. Insert the following lines in the PL3 initialization database file all_apps.pl3 
a. MSEG[0] = { 40000, 1, RW, RW, NA, RO, RO }; 
3. Create the configuration vector using the command line “vector -0 all_aps.pl0 
-1 five_part.pl1 -2 five_part.pl2 -3 all_apps.pl3 –o all_apps” 
4. Re-enable audit by setting the AUDIT_ENABLED constant in lpsk_audit.h to 
TRUE. 
5. Compile the code without the debug option.  
6. Boot the Test Virtual Machine and navigate to the audit test application main 






Table 38.   Results of Acceptance Testing (Successful Events) 
Test ID Menu Selection / Action Expected Results Summary 
A-1 Select “4 – Query number of records in the 
Audit Buffer” 
Number of records in the buffer 
= 8 
Return code = 0 
A-2 Select “1 – Retrieve records”. Enter “1” 




Number of records read = 1 
Return code = 0 
 
 
 Select “4 – Query number of records in the 
Audit Buffer” 
Number of records in the buffer 
= 7 
Return code = 0 
 Repeat A-2 until buffer is empty The number of records in the 
Audit Buffer is decremented by 
1 after each retrieval. 
A-3 Select “2 – View records” to display and 
manually inspect the audit records 
Content of the audit records for 
the following events 
 start of LPSK audit 
subsystem 
 identifying information 
of the configuration 
vector 
 Swap in of 2 dsegs 
defined in the 
configuration vector 
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 Creation of 2 msegs 
defined in the 
configuration vector 
 Successful completion 
of LPSK initialization 
 Successful startup of 
LPSK runtime. 
A-4 Select “4 – Query number of records in the 
Audit Buffer” 
Number of records in the buffer 
= 0 
Return code = 0 
 Press “Alt-Esc” to generate a SAK, and 
then change the partition focus back to the 
audit application. 
Select “1 – Retrieve records”. Enter “1” 
when asked to enter the number of records 
to retrieve. 
 
Number of records read = 1 
Return code = 0 
 
 Select “2 – View records” to display and 
manually inspect the audit records 
Content of the audit record for 
the SAK event 
A-5 Select “4 – Query number of records in the 
Audit Buffer” 
Number of records in the buffer 
= 0 
Return code = 0 
  Press “Alt-Esc” to generate a SAK, and 
then change the partition focus to “3 – 
Test Application”.  
 Select “A – Test eventcounts and 
Number of records read = 4 
Return code = 0 
(Remarks: The test program 
will generate 2 sequencer 
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sequencers” from the Test Menu. 
 Enter ‘Q’ to quit the “read and advance 
eventcount” test 
 Enter ‘0’ when prompted to enter the 
sequencer to ticket 
 Press “Alt-Esc” to generate a SAK, and 
then change the partition focus back to 
the audit application  
 Select “1 – Retrieve records”. Enter “4” 
when asked to enter the number of 
records to retrieve. 
events. The other 2 audit 
records are generated by the 
SAK events) 
 Select “2 – View records” to display and 
manually inspect the audit records 
Content of the audit record for 
the sequencer event  
A-6 Select “4 – Query number of records in the 
Audit Buffer” 
Number of records in the buffer 
= 0 
Return code = 0 
  Press “Alt-Esc” to generate a SAK, and 
then change the partition focus to “3 – 
Test Application”.  
 Enter ‘Q’ to quit the sequencer test 
 Enter ‘Y’ to continue with the “Await 
on Eventcount” test. 
 Press “Alt-Esc” to generate a SAK, and 
then change the partition focus back to 
the audit application  
 Select “1 – Retrieve records”. Enter “3” 
Number of records read = 3 
Return code = 0 
(Remarks: 2 of the audit records 
are generated by the SAK 
events) 
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when asked to enter the number of 
records to retrieve. 
 Select “2 – View records” to display and 
manually inspect the audit records 
Content of the audit record for 
the await on eventcount event 
A-7 Select “4 – Query number of records in the 
Audit Buffer” 
Number of records in the buffer 
= 0 
Return code = 0 
  Press “Alt-Esc” to generate a SAK, and 
then change the partition focus to “4 – 
Test Support”.  
 Enter ‘0’ when prompted for the 
eventcount to advance. 
 Press “Alt-Esc” to generate a SAK, and 
then change the partition focus back to 
the audit application  
 Select “1 – Retrieve records”. Enter “3” 
when asked to enter the number of 
records to retrieve. 
Number of records read = 3 
Return code = 0 
(Remarks: 2 of the audit records 
are generated by the SAK 
events) 
 Select “2 – View records” to display and 
manually inspect the audit records 
Content of the audit record for 
the process woke up event 
Shut down the Test Virtual Machine. To perform tests to verify that audit records 
are generated for failed events, reconfigure the configuration vector by performing the 
following steps: 
1. Insert the following lines in all_apps.pl0 
a. EVENTCOUNT = {"Event  0",  3,  RW, RW, NA, NA, NA }; 
b. SEQUENCER = {"Seq  0",  3,  RW, RW, NA, NA, NA }; 
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2. Create the configuration vector using the command line “vector -0 all_aps.pl0 
-1 five_part.pl1 -2 five_part.pl2 -3 all_apps.pl3 –o all_apps” 
3. Compile the code without the debug option.  
4. Boot the Test Virtual Machine and navigate to the audit test application main 
menu. Perform the steps shown in the “Menu Selection / Action” column of 
Table 39. 
Table 39.   Results of Acceptance Testing (Failed Events) 
Test ID Menu Selection / Action Expected Results Summary 
A-8 Select “1 – Retrieve records”. Enter “6” 
when asked to enter the number of records 
to retrieve. The buffer provided by the test 
application is not big enough to hold all 8 
records. Repeat this step several times  
until number of records read becomes 0. 
 
All the records are read. 
 Select “2 – View records” 8 times to 
display all the audit records. 
Select “4 – Query number of records in the 
Audit Buffer” 
 
Number of records in the buffer 
= 0 
Return code = 0 
  Press “Alt-Esc” to generate a SAK, and 
then change the partition focus to “3 – 
Test Application”.  
 Select “A – Test eventcounts and 
sequencers” from the Test Menu. 
 Enter ‘Q’ to quit the “read and advance 
Number of records read = 3 
Return code = 0 
(Remarks: 2 of the audit records 




 Enter ‘0’ when prompted to enter the 
sequencer to ticket 
 Press “Alt-Esc” to generate a SAK, and 
then change the partition focus back to 
the audit application  
 Select “1 – Retrieve records”. Enter “3” 
when asked to enter the number of 
records to retrieve. 
 Select “2 – View records” to display and 
manually inspect the audit records 
Content of the audit record for 
the sequencer event 
(Event modifier = 0x1) 
A-9 Select “4 – Query number of records in the 
Audit Buffer” 
Number of records in the buffer 
= 0 
Return code = 0 
  Press “Alt-Esc” to generate a SAK, and 
then change the partition focus to “3 – 
Test Application”.  
 Enter ‘Q’ to quit the sequencer test 
 Enter ‘Y’ to continue with the “Await 
on Eventcount” test. 
 Press “Alt-Esc” to generate a SAK, and 
then change the partition focus back to 
the audit application  
 Select “1 – Retrieve records”. Enter “3” 
when asked to enter the number of 
Number of records read = 3 
Return code = 0 
(Remarks: 2 of the audit records 
are generated by the SAK 
events) 
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records to retrieve. 
 Select “2 – View records” to display and 
manually inspect the audit records 
Content of the audit record for 
the await on eventcount event 
(Event modifier = 0x1) 
 
Shut down the Test Virtual Machine. To perform testing of the Audit Buffer,  
modify the size of the Audit Buffer by performing the following steps: 
1. Modify the value of AUDIT_BUFF_SIZE constant in lpsk_audit.h to 512.  
2. Recompile the code without the debug option.  
3. Boot the Test Virtual Machine and navigate to the audit test application main 
menu. Perform the steps shown in the “Menu Selection / Action” column in 
Table 40. 
Table 40.   Results of Acceptance Testing (Audit Buffer) 
Test ID Menu Selection / Action Expected Results Summary 
A-10 Select “4 – Query number of records in the 
Audit Buffer” 
 
Number of records in the buffer 
= 8 
Return code = 0 
  Press “Alt-Esc” to generate a SAK. 
Repeat 10 times to generate 11 SAK 
audit records. 
 Change the partition focus back to the 
audit application. 
 Select “4 – Query number of records in 
the Audit Buffer” 
 
Number of records in the buffer 
= 18 
Return code = 0 
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 Select “5 – Query number of overwritten 
records” 
Number of records overwritten 
= 1 
Return code = 0 
 
Shut down the Test Virtual Machine and disable the audit by performing the 
following steps: 
1. Modify the value of AUDIT_ENABLED constant in lpsk_audit.h to FALSE.  
2. Recompile the code without the debug option.  
3. Boot up the Test Virtual Machine and navigate to the audit test application 
main menu. Perform the steps shown in the “Menu Selection / Action” 
column in Table 41. 
Table 41.   Results of Acceptance Testing when Audit is Disabled 
Test ID Menu Selection / Action Expected Results Summary 
B-1 Select “4 – Query number of records in the 
Audit Buffer” 
 
Number of records in the buffer 
= 0 
Return code = 2 
 Select “1 – Retrieve records”. Enter “1” 
when asked to enter the number of records 
to retrieve.  
 
Number of records in the buffer 
= 0 
Return code = 2 
 Perform the tasks described in A-4 to A9. 
Select “4 – Query number of records in the 
Audit Buffer” 
Number of records in the buffer 
= 0 
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